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PEACEMAKING AND CONSTITUTION-DRAFTING: 
A DYSFUNCTIONAL MARRIAGE 
HALLIE LUDSIN* 
 
A recent trend in conflict resolution is to use the process of 
constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool and the resultant 
constitution as a peace treaty, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Nepal.  Historically, peacemaking and constitution-drafting were 
separate processes; today, warring parties and/or peacemakers 
often demand their merger.  Rarely does the literature on 
constitution-drafting during conflict question whether this merger 
is appropriate.1  Instead, it typically adopts a comparative 
 
* Hallie Ludsin is the Research Director at the South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Centre in New Delhi, India.  This Article was originally written 
for the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, Sri Lanka where the author 
served as a legal consultant.  Thank you to Rohan Edrisinha, Asanga Welikala, 
Amos Guiora, Ravi Nair, Abigail Dubiniecki, Rebecca Everly, and Ravi Nessman 
for their insightful comments on this Article. 
1 See, e.g., Lakhdar Brahimi, State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries, 
7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Building Trust in Government, 
Vienna, Austria, 4 (June 26–29, 2007), available at http://unpan1.un.org 
/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf (“Constitution-
drafting processes should be closely linked to the peace process, must not be 
rushed, and as far as possible, should be carefully aligned with existing legal 
provisions.”); VIVIEN HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, SPECIAL REP. 107, 
U.S. INST. OF PEACE 4 (2003), available at http://www.usip.org 
/files/resources/sr107.pdf (describing participation in the constitution-making 
process as critical to creating and maintaining a peaceful society); Donald L. 
Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1231–32 (2008) (suggesting that changes to the 
constitution-making process, such as avoiding exclusion, might help achieve 
peace and contribute to the overall success of a constitution); Kirsti Samuels, Post-
Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 664 (2006) 
(acknowledging that Haiti and Liberia’s constitutions have had  destabilizing 
effects, but generally supporting the tactic of merging participatory constitution-
making with post-conflict peacemaking); Cornelia Schneider, The International 
Community and Afghanistan’s Constitution, 7 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV.: AN INTERDISC. 
J. 175 (2005), available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk 
/dl/July05Schneider.pdf (arguing that constitution-drafting failed as a 
peacemaking tool in Afghanistan because the constitution-making process was 
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constitution-making approach, which examines different countries’ 
experiences in order to locate variables that affect the success of 
constitutions.2  Champions of constitution-making as a tool for 
peace seem to simply assume the compatibility of the two 
processes.3  This assumption, however, must be challenged to 
 
defective); Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, UNU-
WIDER (Research Paper No. 2005/51) 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-
papers/2005/en_GB/rp2005-51/ (recognizing that the relationship between 
constitution-writing and decreased levels of violence is not always successful, but 
never questioning the suitability of the merger between constitution-writing and 
peace-making efforts).  But see Vicki C. Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflections on 
Timing, Naming, and Constitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1294 (2008) 
(explaining that if the timing and process of constitution-making is unsuitable, 
constitution-making in post-conflict situations may lead to weak, short-lived 
constitutions, and hence a return to instability); Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism 
About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1473, 1493–95 (2008) 
(criticizing the perceived utility of inclusion in a given country’s constitution-
drafting process on the advice of foreign constitutional experts). 
2 See, e.g., Brahimi, supra note 1, at 8 (attributing South Africa’s successful 
constitution-making to variables such as public participation); Hart, supra note 1, 
at 7 (describing the history of constitution-making in countries such as Canada, 
Nicaragua, and South Africa); Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making 
and its Pathology in Iraq, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 536, 536 (2007) (focusing on the 
history of failure of the constitution-making process in Iraq); Kirsti Samuels, 
Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: A Discussion Of Twelve Case 
Studies, Second Draft, INTERNATIONAL IDEA, http://www.idea.int/cbp 
/upload/IDEA%20CBP%20Comparative%20paper%20by%20Kirsti%20Samuels-
2.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (analyzing twelve cases of constitution-building 
that have taken place during times of transition); Schneider, supra note 1 
(analyzing the variables involved in the constitution-making process in 
Afghanistan); Widner, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting preliminary findings on the 
effects of constitution-writing in over “194 constitution-writing cases carried out 
since 1975”).   
 In fact, often the literature simply lumps constitution-drafting during conflicts 
into the analysis of post-conflict constitution-drafting and shifts from 
authoritarian to democratic political systems.  See Samuels, supra note 1, at 667 
(stating “that how constitutions are made, particularly following civil conflict or 
authoritarian rule, impacts the resulting state and its transition to democracy[,]” 
yet never differentiating between the two political systems and their dissimilar 
needs).  But see Horowitz, supra note 1, at 1231 (arguing that the constitution-
making process is not uniform and should take into account wide-ranging 
scenarios); Jackson, supra note 1, at 1249 (arguing that there should be different 
approaches to constitution-making depending on the situation at hand).  See 
generally Kim Lane Scheppele, A Constitution Between Past and Future, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1377 (2008) (analyzing the relationship between a country’s pre-
constitutional history and post-conflict constitution-making).  
3 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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ensure that promoting the combined process does not inherently 
risk the failure of both peacemaking and constitutional goals.  This 
Article specifically questions whether too much pressure is being 
placed on constitution-drafting by expecting it to create peace 
while designing a stable foundation for the state.  The analysis 
focuses solely on constitution-drafting as a tool to stop ongoing 
violence and its predicted outcome; it does not examine 
constitution-drafting as a post-conflict measure to prevent further 
violent outbreaks.4 
Part 1 of this Article explains the theoretical support for 
constitution-drafting and constitutions as a major tool for 
peacemaking.  It then discusses the differing goals of peacemaking 
and constitution-drafting, describing theoretical efforts to 
harmonize them.  Part 2 tackles more practical issues, scrutinizing 
the intrinsic tensions that arise from the merger of the two 
processes.  Many of these tensions have been examined elsewhere 
as potential pitfalls in the constitution-drafting/peacemaking 
process, but not as an inherent threat to the merged process caused 
by nothing more than the differing goals of the two processes and 
their sometimes contradictory needs.  Part 2 also describes the 
potential consequences if the combined process fails.  It ultimately 
concludes that the assumption of compatibility of the peacemaking 
and constitution-drafting processes is inappropriate.  While 
theoretically the goals of the two processes can be harmonized, in 
practice peacemaking needs are likely to subordinate constitution-
making goals.  The subordination of one set of goals to the other 
risks the sustainability of peace and weakens the foundation of the 
state. 
Part 3 concludes this Article by examining whether 
constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool can be salvaged when 
warring parties refuse other types of peacemaking efforts.  
Peacemakers cannot overlook combatant demands but the process 
design must be handled carefully if it is to be successful.  Part 3 
 
4 This latter situation differs from constitution-drafting during conflict, as 
ongoing violence is less likely to threaten the process and efforts at reconciliation 
are likely to be greater.  By incorporating both circumstances into one analysis, 
authors can avoid having to question the underlying assumption of compatibility.  
Having highlighted the need to separate conflict from post-conflict, the dividing 
line between these types of situations will not always be clear. 
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concludes that undertaking a multi-stage constitutional process 
that establishes an interim constitution may be able to overcome 
the practical problems of merging constitutional and peacemaking 
goals.  The drafting of a permanent constitution, however, must 
wait for more peaceful, secure, and stable times. 
1. UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTION-DRAFTING  
AS A PEACEMAKING TOOL 
Local and international demands underlie the drive to use 
constitution-making as a peacemaking tool.  Grassroots pressure 
for constitutional change commonly surfaces in identity conflicts in 
which historically excluded minority groups refuse to lay down 
arms until they receive binding protection for their rights.5 
Alternatively, warring groups may demand a new constitution 
when the conflict arises over the existing design of the state.6  
Either way, peace may be impossible to achieve without 
guaranteeing constitutional amendments or the drafting of a new 
constitution. 
International support for the use of constitution-drafting as a 
peacemaking tool developed from a fairly recent view that 
sustainable peace can be achieved best through the process of 
peace-building.7  The goals of peace-building are to “consolidate 
peace in the short term; and, in the long term, increase the 
likelihood that future conflicts are resolved without violence.”8  A 
 
5 See, e.g., Proceedings, Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, Princeton 
University, May 17–20, 2007, Bobst Center for Peace & Justice, Princeton 
University, in conjunction with Interpeace and International IDEA, at 25 
(describing the difficulty of convincing sectarian groups to compromise and 
participate in the constitution-making process).  
6 See YASH GHAI & GUIDO GALLI, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL 
ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTION BUILDING PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIZATION 7 (2006), 
available at http://www.idea.int/publications/cbp_democratization/upload 
/cbp_democratization_eng.pdf (“The new constitutional system has to be 
responsive to the concerns of the previously warring factions . . . .”). 
7 See ROLAND PARIS & TIMOTHY D. SISK, INT’L PEACE ACAD., MANAGING 
CONTRADICTIONS: THE INHERENT DILEMMAS OF POSTWAR STATEBUILDING 1 (2007), 
http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/iparpps.pdf (describing 
state-building as “a crucial element in any larger effort to create the conditions for 
a durable peace and human development in countries that are just emerging from 
war”).  
8 Joakim Gundel, Book Review, 15 J. REFUGEE STUD. 334, 334 (2002).  To 
achieve those goals, peace-builders seek to reconstruct the economic, political, and 
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major component of peace-building is the process of state-building, 
through which state institutions are reformed or strengthened to 
permit effective and, ideally, participatory governance, which in 
turn is expected to create stability and security.9  State-building 
demands the creation of a durable framework for good 
governance, strong institutions for peaceful conflict resolution, and 
the development of, or return to, the rule of law.10  A constitution is 
an easily identifiable symbol of, and tangible step toward, state-
building and, therefore, peace-building. 
More concretely, the constitution-drafting process is believed to 
offer conflicting parties the opportunity to sit together and hammer 
out a binding, mutually-acceptable document that responds to 
each party’s needs.11  Warring parties are expected to maintain a 
cease-fire during the drafting process, letting the drafting serve as 
a peaceful negotiation process.  The constitution is then expected to 
 
social foundations of a conflict-ridden society; they operate development 
programs, drive political and legal reform efforts, and establish social 
reconciliation projects.  See Fen Osler Hampson, Can Peacebuilding Work?, 30 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 701, 702 (1997) (stating the different definitions of peace-
building and the varying approaches to  implementing it); Markus Kostner, Taies 
Nezam, Colin Scott & Nat J. Colletta, From Civil War to Civil Society: The Transition 
from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia 6 (The World Bank and The Carter Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 18990, 1997), http://www.cartercenter.org/documents 
/1200.pdf (describing the goal of peace-building as being attainable through 
confidence-building programs that “balance the quest for justice for the victims of 
violence with the need to get on with life as one society”). 
9 See Charles T. Call & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace 
7 (Int’l Peace Acad., Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, 2007), available at 
http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/cwc_working_paper_endi
ng_wars_ccec.pdf (explaining the different ways in which successful state-
building supports peace-building); see also Brahimi, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that 
state-building can succeed only through strong state institutions). 
10 See Brahimi, supra note 1, at 4 (describing state-building as a central part of 
creating peace); Samuels, supra note 1, at 664 (“[A] successful political and 
governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building 
mission.”).  There is some debate on whether peace-building includes efforts to 
establish democracy and the rule of law, as some believe inclusion of these goals 
creates unrealistic expectations.  See Hampson, supra note 8, at 701 (presenting 
different views on what should be the goal of peace-building).  However, most of 
the literature expects that these two goals remain important aspects of the state-
building and peace-building processes. 
11 See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 1, at 667 (“The process of constitution-building 
can provide a forum for the negotiation of solutions to the divisive or contested 
issues that led to violence.”). 
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settle underlying disputes while offering long-term stability, 
security, and justice.12  The constitution-drafting process itself 
creates the initial peace, while the substance of the constitution 
maintains it.  As Yash Ghai explains: 
Agreement on national values, even national identity, and 
new institutions and procedures may not only consolidate 
peace but also provide for future co-existence and co-
operation.  Through the entrenchment of the settlement in a 
fundamental document not susceptible to easy amendment, 
it can bring an effective closure to the “conflict situation.”13 
Support for using constitution-drafting processes and constitutions 
as a peacemaking tool seems logical, at least in theory.  Part 2 
examines whether this logic can hold up under deeper scrutiny. 
2. A FALSE ASSUMPTION 
The link between constitutional development and peace seems 
sound—a constitution that provides a strong foundation for the 
rule of law, peaceful conflict resolution, and a representative 
government should secure peace.  What is missing from the 
descriptions of the importance of peace-building through 
constitutional development is whether a merged process is likely 
to be successful.  Proponents of constitution-drafting as a 
peacemaking tool simply assume the compatibility of the two 
processes.14  They fail to examine whether the goals of the two 
processes are complementary, whether the needs of the two 
processes are likely to clash, and the impact the differing needs and 
goals of the two processes could have on the success of the 
constitution-drafting/peacemaking.  Part 2 considers each of these 
issues in detail. 
 
12 See Yash Ghai, Toward Inclusive and Participatory Constitution Making, 
Presentation at The Constitution Reform Process: Comparative Perspectives 
Kathmandu (Nagarkot) 2–3 (Aug. 3–5, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www.idea.int/news/upload/Nepal%20-%20workshop%20paper%20-
%20Yash%20Ghai.pdf) (describing constitutions as tools of conflict resolution that 
can create peace through negotiations and dialogue). 
13 Id. at 3. 
14 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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2.1. Complementary Goals? 
The obvious and most important goal of peacemaking is to halt 
violence.  At a minimum, maintaining peace, both in the short and 
long-term, requires establishing immediate physical security, 
stabilizing a volatile situation, building trust between the warring 
groups, and negotiating a consensus on how to achieve a peaceful 
social order.  The culmination of peacemaking is a peace treaty.  A 
peace treaty can take any number of forms, including that of a 
constitution.15  Regardless of form, it is expected that a peace treaty 
will declare a cease-fire, establish a process for demobilizing and 
disarming warring parties, and design the processes for a 
transition to peaceful conflict resolution.16  Some peace treaties also 
include extensive provisions for new or refurbished political and 
legal institutions and for transitional justice mechanisms.17  While 
these more extensive agreements reflect peace-building goals, 
ending violence immediately always remains the peace treaty’s 
primary aim.  Many conflicts generate numerous peace-treaties 
that build upon each other as peacemakers attempt to maintain 
momentum toward peace by resolving continuing and developing 
issues through newer agreements. 
Constitution-drafting traditionally serves different goals than 
peacemaking.  The drafting process is expected to develop a 
document that creates the foundation of the state by developing a 
framework for governance.18  Constitutions are generally forward-
 
15 The form of a peace treaty is particularly relevant to determining its 
binding nature.  See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 383–84 (2006) (expressing the difficulty in deciding whether 
peace treaties are binding legal agreements and whether this matters). 
16 See id. at 377–78 (describing constitutions as an example of 
substantive/framework agreements which can serve as binding peace agreements 
in an otherwise unstable nation).  
17 But see Ashraf Ghani et al., An Agenda for State-Building in the Twenty-First 
Century, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 101, 109 (2006) (describing that peace 
agreements should be about halting violence, while establishing functioning 
dispute-resolution mechanisms should be left to political agreements). 
18 See GHAI & GALLI, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing the role and impact a 
constitution plays in a democracy); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role 
of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2053 (1997) (describing the 
classical view of the role of constitutions). 
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looking,19 anticipating the long-term needs and desires of the 
constituencies they serve.  They set the stage for the smooth 
operation of the government and for peaceful relations between 
and within the government and its constituents, creating security 
and stability.  They also reflect national values, norms, and 
identity.20  Constitutions accomplish these goals by providing for 
mechanisms and rules that establish a state-monopoly on the use 
of force; establish institutions of governance; limit state power 
through human rights protections; provide for a smooth transition 
when governments change; permit participation and 
representation of the population; and establish institutions for 
peaceful dispute resolution.21  Drafters typically make it difficult to 
amend provisions of the constitution to protect them from short-
term political whims and maintain political order and stability.22 
Constitutions are expected to preserve peaceful relations 
between constituents of a state, as well as between the constituents 
and the government, a goal that presupposes security, stability, 
and a common vision for the future.  Constitutions anticipate 
potential points of friction and draw boundaries around the 
permissible behavior of citizens and the government to protect 
people’s rights and limit their discontent.  Constitutions also 
establish a legal system to enforce those boundaries, which 
includes mechanisms to address complaints when those 
boundaries are breached.  Classically, “it is not the vocation of law 
or constitution to stabilize social order and to form political 
consensus.  Instead, a constitution is an end-result, a codified 
document of social and political consensus.”23  Traditionally, 
 
19 See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2057–58 (characterizing the prevailing classical 
view of constitutionalism as distinct from the conception of transitional 
constitution-making, which is “ambivalent in its directionality”).  But see Jackson, 
supra note 1, at 1280 (“Without a linkage to some imagined past, constitutions 
could not do the work of helping to constitute a particular community.”). 
20 See GHAI AND GALLI, supra note 6, at 8 (describing the functions a 
constitution serves). 
21 See id. (listing specific ways that a constitution “contributes to  
democracy”).  
22 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 15, at 392 (commenting on the substantive 
differences between peace-agreement constitutions and those constitutions 
originating from “stable, democratic societies)”). 
23 Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, From Origin to Delta: Changing 
Landscape of Modern Constitutionalism 6–7 (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 
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constitutions deflect an abstract, future potential for anarchy or 
government oppression rather than the very concrete threat of 
existing violence that peace treaties target. 
Conceptually, peacemaking and constitution-drafting intend to 
accomplish different goals.  At its essence, peacemaking 
concentrates on stopping violence, while constitution-drafting 
focuses on establishing a functioning and ordered state.  Peace-
treaties reflect the immediate changes and compromises necessary 
to end violent conflict, while constitutions codify an existing 
consensus on national identity and values and on how society 
wishes to be governed, anticipating future threats to peaceful 
relations.  A peace-treaty may adopt measures that radically 
change the government and politics in a conflict zone, while 
traditionally constitutions create stability by protecting against 
such changes. 
Can these differing goals be harmonized?  Theorists argue that 
using constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool has created a 
new type of constitution—the transitional constitution.24  The 
transitional constitution adapts the classic roles and functions of 
constitutions to respond to the peacemaking needs of conflict and 
post-conflict societies.25  This new style of constitution is intended 
to respond to the conceptual “tension between [the] radical 
political change [required to end a conflict] and the constraints on 
such change that would appear to be the predicate of constitutional 
order.”26 
The dominant set of theorists view the transitional constitution 
as causing a revolution through the act of creating a new political 
order for the state.27  It is the final act of breaking from the past that 
 
No. 1815, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=8667&context=expresso. 
24 See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 18, at 2057–58 (arguing that the creation of new 
constitutional arrangements in periods of dramatic political change is informed by 
a “transitional conception of constitutional justice”); Samuels, supra note 1, at 667–
68 (discussing the meaning of “transitional constitutionalism”). 
25 See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2057 (exploring the concept of a “transitional 
constitution”).  
26 Id. at 2053. 
27 Ackerman, one of the modern theorists, does not limit transformative 
constitution-making to revolutions, but allows for the possibility of change to this 
type of “higher law” under other circumstances.  The most common example of 
this type of constitution is the United States Constitution.  Id. at 2054–56. 
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signifies the end of or solution to the conflict.28  The role of the 
transitional constitution contrasts directly with traditional notions 
that a constitution protects against such dramatic political 
change.29  Like the “traditional” constitution, transitional 
constitutions are forward-looking, establishing an ideal foundation 
for the state that permits the population to “put the past behind 
and move to a brighter future.”30  Effectively, however, the 
dominant position maintains the foundational role and permanent 
structure that epitomizes traditional constitutions. 
A school of thought espoused by Ruti Teitel diverges from this 
view, theorizing that transitional constitutions permit the 
revolution rather than complete it.31  The transitional constitution 
in her conception “mediates the process of political change,” 
reflecting a consensus on how political change should occur rather 
than what that change will be.32  The transitional constitution is 
continually subject to development and in some instances is 
intended only as an interim measure.33  Teitel describes the 
transitional constitution-drafting process as gradual, moving in 
“fits and starts,”34 rather than as the finishing act.  For her, 
ultimately the new foundation created by the 
peacemaking/constitution-drafting process responds directly to 
 
28 Id. at 2053. 
29 See id. at 2053–56 (discussing the differences between the classical and 
modern views of constitutional theory). 
30 Id. at 2056.  Others argue that the dominant style of transitional 
constitutions also reflects on the past as history determines the priorities and 
needs of the population.  See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2, at 1378–79. 
31 See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2057 (proposing “another account of a 
transitional constitutionalism, which better captures constitutional politics 
associated with transformative periods”). 
32 Id. at 2058.  See also Samuels, supra note 1, at 664 (noting that a constitution 
may take on aspects of both a peace agreement and a framework of rules detailing 
how that government will operate); Jackson, supra note 1, at 1255 (“[Transitional 
constitutions] offer the possibility of a new genre of constitution-like instruments 
whose goal is not to entrench but to disentrench and to provide ongoing 
opportunities for “unsettlement” of power relations.”). 
33 South Africa’s Interim Constitution, as described in Part 3.1, is an example 
of Teitel’s transitional constitution.  Teitel, supra note 18, at 2060.   
34 Id. at 2057. 
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past injustices; the process and constitution therefore not only look 
forward but also reflect on the past.35 
Vivien Hart advocates for a new type of constitutionalism 
similar to Teitel’s theory of transitional constitution, explaining: 
Traditional constitution making as a conclusion of conflict 
and codification of a settlement that intends permanence 
and stability can seem to threaten rather than reassure.  
Citizens who actively reject a final act of closure seek 
instead assurances that constitution making will not freeze 
the present distribution of power into place for the long 
term, nor exclude the possibility of new participants and 
different outcomes . . . .  The constitution of new 
constitutionalism is . . . a conversation, conducted by all 
concerned, open to new entrants and issues, seeking a 
workable formula that will be sustainable rather than 
assuredly stable.36 
Hart describes the challenge of the new constitutionalism as 
finding a balance between the traditional goals of constitution-
making, including building a stable and secure foundation for the 
state, and the flexibility necessary to mediate conflict and 
divisions.37 
Transitional constitutions, regardless of the differences 
between theorists, serve both peacemaking and constitution-
drafting goals.  Proponents of transitional constitutions list a 
variety of benefits of the process and the document it creates.  One 
of the main benefits is that the process offers society the 
 
35 Id. at 2052.  Teitel appears to envisage an eventual final constitution or a 
process that leads to a final constitutional solution, a position with which Jackson 
does not necessarily agree.  See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1288–89 (discussing “post-
conflict constitutionalism” as a “continuous conversation”).  The experience with 
constitution-drafting in Lebanon, as described in Part 2.2.1.2, shows that Jackson’s 
position may be dangerously correct. 
36 Hart, supra note 1, at 3.  See also Jackson, supra note 1, at 1249–51 (noting 
that creating a written constitution or labeling the process constitutional may be 
“antithetical” to the type of permanent and stable “constitutionalism that it seeks 
to promote”).  
37 See Hart, supra note 1, at 3 (“The tension between the security and stability 
offered by the traditional ideal of constitutionalism and the flexibility called for by 
new circumstances is what places process at the heart of the new 
constitutionalism.”). 
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opportunity to reflect on the past to create a new future and, by 
doing so, solves the causes of the conflict.38  The process and 
document serve to de-legitimize past injustices and draw new 
boundaries for what behavior is permissible.39  It is also expected 
that the constitution will “jump start . . . political change”40 by 
creating stable institutions.  It will set the foundation for the rule of 
law that could re-legitimize the government. 
Most importantly, perhaps, the constitution as a peace treaty 
could be viewed as a social contract to keep the peace.41  Since the 
warring parties are typically included as constitution-drafters, their 
support could be viewed as an agreement to use the peaceful 
mechanisms of dispute resolution they designed rather than resort 
to violence when conflicts arise.42  The binding nature of a 
constitution may create more incentive for the participants to 
follow the principles and provisions of the constitution they 
drafted.43  The hope is that the constitution will provide the 
opportunity to change the political culture, including behavior, 
expectations and norms, so that the constituency comes to depend 
on peace.44 
The concept of transitional constitutions harmonizes the very 
different goals of peacemaking and constitution-drafting, at least 
theoretically.  As this section shows, its supporters can list 
numerous benefits to relying on constitution-drafting and 
 
38 See Samuels, supra note 1, at 664 (discussing what an “ideal constitution-
making process” can achieve). 
39 See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2052 (“Transitional constitutionmaking 
responds to past repressive rule, through principles delimiting and redefining the 
prevailing political system.”). 
40 Id. at 2059. 
41 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 15, at 392 (explaining that such “social contracts” 
exist both vertically, between individuals and the state, and also horizontally 
between separate groups of individuals). 
42 See Ghai, supra note 12, at 2–3 (highlighting the “importance of the 
constitutional making to the peace process”). 
43 See Bell, supra note 15, at 386 (discussing the importance of a constitution’s 
binding nature, specifically noting that “parties to agreements take their 
obligations more seriously when they believe them to be legal”). 
44 See Samuels, supra note 1, at 667 (“It can also lead to the democratic 
education of the population, begin a process of healing and reconciliation through 
societal dialogue, and forge a new consensus vision of the future of the state.”)  
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constitutions as a peacemaking tool, which makes this option 
appealing.  The remainder of Part 2 challenges whether the goals 
and needs of the two processes can be so cleanly synchronized. 
 
2.2. The Inherent Tensions in Constitution-drafting as a Peacemaking 
Tool 
Policy-makers often merge constitution-drafting and 
peacemaking without considering the deep and inherent tensions 
that arise from the conflicting goals and needs of the two 
processes.  They describe the consequences of these tensions as 
pitfalls to be avoided but rarely examine why they emerge.45  By 
avoiding the deeper analysis, policy-makers are able to simply 
assume they can be sidestepped, albeit with some maneuvering.  
Once the pitfalls are recognized as arising directly from the 
intrinsic conflicts between the goals and needs of peacemaking and 
constitution-drafting, it becomes impossible and possibly even 
reckless to assume the compatibility of the two processes. 
The tensions inherent in a merged constitution-
drafting/peacemaking process fall into four general categories:  (1) 
sequencing tensions; (2) timeframe tensions; (3) tensions between 
short and long-term goals; and (4) tensions over participation in 
constitution-drafting.46  Part 2.2 examines each of the tensions in 
turn, highlighting the practical problems they create that may be 
impossible to overcome.  This Section does not identify all of the 
problems that may emerge in a merged process or search for the 
variables that play a role in its success; rather, it focuses solely on 
describing the inherent tensions of a combined process and 
assessing their threat to the success of either or both constitution-
drafting and peacemaking goals.  Further, it does not argue that 
each and every tension will necessarily erupt every time 
constitution-drafting is used as a peacemaking tool, but simply that 
 
45 But see Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 26 
(describing how the goals of reform during the peace negotiations process differ 
markedly from those of the drafting or re-drafting of a constitution). 
46 There may be other categories of tensions, but these predominate in the 
literature on and experiences with conflict.  
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the likelihood some or all will emerge is so great as to send out a 
warning to all considering such processes. 
Different people use different measures to determine the 
success of constitution-drafting and constitutions as a peacemaking 
tool.47  For example, some measure success by whether parties lay 
down arms in favor of solving disputes through the institutions 
created by the constitutions.48  Others consider whether the 
constitutions achieve “constitutional patriotism;”49 warring parties, 
the government, and society must be “patriotic” to the terms of the 
constitutions by implementing and following them.  Another 
group measures success by whether the population can unite 
under a national identity, accept national values and work within 
national institutions, particularly in conflicts involving minority 
groups or sectarian divisions.50  Still others look not only at 
whether the constitutions maintain peace, but at whether they 
create representative governments that protect human rights.51  At 
a minimum, underlying all of these measures of success seem to be 
the criteria that:  (1) the violence ends; (2) the population has a 
solid basis for unifying; (3) the substance of the constitution 
addresses the current and future needs and interests of the whole 
population;52 and (4) the constitution is accepted as legitimate by 
the parties to the conflict and the general population.53 
 
47 See, e.g., Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 6–10 
(enumerating different measures of constitutional success to include: 
constitutional durability; a reduction in violence; increased public awareness of 
the terms of the constitution; enfranchisement of the public; the presence of 
constitutional terms that respect political and civil rights; the promotion of 
political accountability; whether constitutional terms are implemented; and 
adaptability of the constitution).   
48 See id. at 7–8 (explaining what is meant by the success or failure of a 
constitution). 
49 See Hanna Lerner, The People of the Constitution: Constitution-Making, 
Legitimacy, Identity 15–16 (Apr. 30, 2004) (Department of Political Science, 
Columbia University), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/pdf-
files/apsa_lerner.pdf (describing the concept of constitutional patriotism as 
loyalty to democratic procedures of the constitution rather than to a specific 
community, history, or language). 
50 Ghai, supra note 12, at 4. 
51 See generally, Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5 
(noting the increased prominence of human rights in contemporary constitutions).  
52 On the one hand, the inclusion of the need for a constitution to represent 
the interests of the whole of the population seems to be value-laden.  It shows a 
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It is important to keep these underlying criteria for success in 
mind throughout the examination in Sections 2.2.1. through 2.2.4. 
of the practical tensions created when peacemaking and 
constitution-drafting processes are merged.  As Section 2.2. argues, 
these tensions are difficult to resolve and their resolution can lead 
to the sacrifice of either peacemaking goals or, more often, the 
goals of drafting a constitution strong enough to serve as the 
foundation of the nation and visionary enough to survive in the 
long term.  Sacrificing any of the goals of either process could 
make it unlikely if not impossible that constitution-drafting as a 
peacemaking tool will meet the underlying criteria for success.  
There may be times when there is no choice but to use this 
peacemaking tool and certainly there have been objective successes 
with it.54  The analysis in this section, however, shatters the 
assumption of compatibility of constitution-drafting and 
peacemaking processes and, in doing so, challenges the support for 
constitution-drafting as a primary tool for achieving peace.  While 
the goals of constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool are 
laudable, the consequences of its failure are potentially severe, a 
point raised in Section 2.3. 
 
preference, to an extent, of a democratic need.  The reason this is included within 
the criteria for success is that, as this paper argues throughout this section, the 
exclusion of the interests of a portion of the population could easily lead to 
continued, renewed, or new conflict that is antithetical to the goals of a 
constitution-drafting/peacemaking process. 
53 Noticeably missing from the list of factors determining success is the 
longevity of the constitution.  Constitutions are often short-lived and may 
accomplish both constitutional and peacemaking goals immediately and 
sufficiently to allow for later, appropriate constitutional development.  See Ran 
Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” 87 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 
1353–54 (2009). 
 Another open question concerns when a constitution should achieve each of 
these four criteria.  An illegitimate constitution may gain legitimacy with time.  
While this may be true, it would be hard to view a constitutional process as 
successful in a conflict situation if society is continually pulled back into violence 
until that legitimacy is achieved. 
54 See infra Section 3. 
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2.2.1. Sequencing Tensions 
2.2.1.1. Security as a Precondition 
The differing goals of constitution-drafting and peacemaking 
raise two important tensions related to the sequencing of the 
drafting process.  The first tension is a chicken-and-egg question:  
which must come first, security or a constitution?  The conceptual 
assumption, as described in Section 1, is that the drafting will occur 
during a cease-fire, as parties will agree to stop fighting during 
constitutional negotiations.  Unfortunately, reality often does not 
live up to theory.  Constitution-drafting processes are frequently 
undertaken despite continued violence to placate warring parties 
and/or the international community.  In these circumstances, the 
assumption is that a constitution must precede security and bring 
about an abrupt end to violence.  As this Section explains, 
achieving a legitimate constitution and a stable foundation for a 
state depends on security or a cease-fire.  When constitution-
drafting is adopted as the primary tool for peace a conundrum is 
created:  peace cannot occur without a constitution and a 
successful constitution cannot be achieved without peace. 
Continued violence builds numerous obstacles to developing a 
successful constitution, and therefore a successful peace treaty.  
The first, and perhaps most dangerous obstacle, is that the 
continued violence may simply be a rejection of the peacemaking 
process.  It may be a sign that a warring party is unwilling to agree 
to any type of peace treaty or, more specifically, to a constitution as 
a peace agreement.  Alternatively, violence may become a tactic of 
a warring party to ensure that concessions are made in its favor—if 
the warring group does not agree with draft provisions, it may 
wreak havoc to gain advantages in negotiation.55  Such bad faith 
makes it extremely difficult for constitution-drafting to achieve 
either peacemaking or constitutional goals. 
Even where warring parties are interested in undertaking 
constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool, security is a 
precondition to establishing a legitimate constitution.  Without 
 
55 See William Maley, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Transitions, 6 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 683, 686–87 (2006) (discussing the “spoiler problem” which plagues 
peace negotiations due to the fact that it is easier to be a disrupter than a builder 
in the peacemaking process). 
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security, negotiators may find it difficult to participate in the 
drafting process; they may be subject to intimidation or may find it 
impossible to arrive at the negotiations.56  Ongoing violence also 
may limit the participation of the broader population.57  Popular 
participation currently is considered a requirement for establishing 
the legitimacy of a constitution, a point examined more fully in 
Section 2.2.4.infra.  Drafting the constitution/peace treaty without a 
cease-fire in place also may inhibit consensus in the drafting 
process.  Insecurity and continued conflict could polarize the 
warring groups and harden uncompromising positions, all of 
which will only inflame the conflict and undermine both 
constitution-drafting and peacemaking goals. 
Iraq provides the paradigmatic example of the failures that 
result when a constitution-drafting process is conducted without 
first establishing a cease-fire.  Numerous Sunni groups in Iraq 
continued an insurgency against the Shiite and Kurdish 
populations and the U.S. soldiers present in Iraq, even after the 
U.S. declared the successful end of its international war with 
Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-controlled government.  Despite the 
continued violence, the Iraqi transitional government undertook 
the drafting of a permanent constitution.  The U.S. government 
heavily pressured the transitional government to proceed with the 
constitution-drafting process regardless of the violence, advocating 
that peace would follow a new constitution.58 
The failure to achieve a cease-fire prior to undergoing 
constitution-drafting set the process up for failure.  From a security 
standpoint, meaningful participation was hampered by the 
insurgency.  Drafters faced severe intimidation, including the 
 
56 See, e.g., Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 33 
(discussing examples from Afghanistan, East Timor, and Columbia where specific 
measures were taken to reduce intimidation and facilitate the drafting process). 
57 See, e.g., id. at 26 (noting how violence in Afghanistan’s countryside limited 
levels of participation in constructing the country’s constitution). 
58 See James Glanz, U.S. Builds Pressure for Iraq Constitution as Deadline Nears, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005 (describing how the United States pressured Iraqi 
political leaders to reach agreement on a constitution during continued 
insecurity); see also Jonathan Morrow, Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An 
Opportunity Lost, 155 U.S. INST. PEACE SPEC. REP. 4, 4 (2003) (“[C]ompletion of a 
permanent constitution would represent an important, perhaps critical, turning 
point in Iraq’s fortunes”). 
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murder of a Sunni participant.59  The public had little access to the 
drafters and almost no opportunity to observe the process because 
of security fears.60  Such lack of participation undermined the 
legitimacy of the drafting process.61 
Even more problematic, the continued violence represented the 
Sunni insurgents’ rejection of constitution-drafting as a 
peacemaking tool.  A combination of a Sunni boycott of elections 
for a transitional government and violent intimidation of Sunni 
voters ensured that this group was severely underrepresented in 
the transitional government and therefore in the drafting process.62  
It is hard to imagine how constitution-drafting as a peacemaking 
tool can work without the participation of the group primarily 
responsible for the on-going violence.  As a concession to the need 
for their participation, fifteen Sunni drafters and ten advisers were 
added to the process one month before the draft was due.  At this 
point, an estimated seventy to eighty percent of the draft 
constitution may have been completed and the Shiites and Kurds 
resisted Sunni revisions fearing that their prior fragile 
compromises would fall apart.63  When the drafters could not reach 
 
59 See Jusfiq Hadjar, Iraq constitution panel members killed, AL JAZEERA, July 19, 
2005, available at http://www.uruknet.info/?p=13890 (reporting that three Sunni 
Arab members of the constitution drafting committee were shot dead in 
Baghdad). 
60 As the United States Institute of Peace, an American government conflict 
resolution think tank that worked in Iraq with drafters and other participants, 
describes: 
Every meeting of the Committee, the National Assembly, and the 
Leadership Council took place behind the blast walls, barbed wire, and 
gun turrets of Baghdad’s International Zone.  Iraqi citizens could gain 
entry to the International Zone only after time-consuming and 
dangerous queuing and multiple body searches.  phone [sic] lines and 
internet connections were uniformly bad.  The opportunity for Iraqis to 
communicate, either formally or informally, with their constituent 
representatives was practically nil. 
Morrow, supra note 58, at 18. 
61 Id.  
62 See Id. at 6 (explaining that low Sunni voter turnout in elections preceding 
the drafting of the constitution excluded advancement of Sunni issues in the 
drafting process).  
63 See Nathan J. Brown, Iraq’s Constitutional Process Plunges Ahead, POL’Y 
OUTLOOK (Carnegie Endow. for Int’l Peace, D.C.), July 2005, at 7 (detailing the lack 
of Sunni participation in the drafting process). 
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an agreement on fundamental constitutional matters, the Sunni 
drafters were excluded from the informal discussions that 
ultimately resolved those issues.64 
The referendum required to pass the constitution reflects 
overall Sunni rejection of constitutional efforts to achieve peace 
and build a foundation for the state.  A large number of Sunnis 
objected heavily to the constitution’s decentralization of the 
government, to the formula for sharing oil wealth, and to the role 
of Islam in the constitution, among other issues.65  96.96% of voters 
in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province  where the insurgency 
continued unabated  voted against the constitution and about 
82% of Sunni-dominated Salahaddin province voted against it; in 
two other provinces 55% and 49% voted against the constitution.66  
The constitution, however, was adopted despite apparent Sunni 
rejection of the text.  These statistics led the United States Institute 
of Peace, the U.S. government’s think tank on conflict resolution, to 
caution:  “[w]e should confront the reality that Sunni Arab 
opposition to the constitution that emerged during the negotiations 
will continue, and that a national ‘yes’ vote may have consolidated 
Sunni Arab isolation . . . .”67 
Six years later, while some measure of security has been 
achieved, USIP describes the situation in Iraq as follows:  “Iraqi 
society is fractured.  Profound distrust, sectarian animosity, and 
the desire for revenge run high, as communities come to grips with 
the effect of six years of war.”68  The constitution-drafting process 
did little to heal societal divisions or to achieve sustainable peace.  
 
64 The United States Institute of Peace describes that: “The expectation was 
quite clear: the Shia and Kurdish parties would agree to a constitutional text, 
which would then be presented as a fait accompli to the Sunni Arabs, who would 
be asked to take it or leave it.”  See Morrow, supra note 58, at 9. 
65 See Ellen Knickmeyer & Jonathan Finer, Iraqis Submit Charter, but Delay 
Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2005, at A1 (summarizing Sunni objections to the 
constitution).  
66 See Morrow, supra note 58, at 2 (discussing Sunni opposition to the new 
constitution).  
67 Id. at 21.  In fact, Sunni drafters warned that if the constitution passed 
despite Sunni objections, the violence would continue unabated.  See also 
Knickmeyer & Finer, supra note 65 (underscoring the objections of Sunni 
constitutional delegates and the potential for civil unrest). 
68 Iraq: The Current Situation, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 
http://www.usip.org/node/4598 (last visited January 10, 2011). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
05 LUDSIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:22 PM 
258 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
 
Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Special Advisor to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations who monitored post-conflict Iraq, 
blames this outcome in part on the failure to achieve a ceasefire as 
a precursor to constitution-drafting.69  He describes: 
[I]t must be understood that a constitution cannot be 
rammed through too early in the process:  people coming 
out of a conflict are hardly capable of building the national 
consensus required for the successful drafting of a 
constitution.  This is more so if, as was the case with Iraq, 
conflict is still raging.70 
The Iraqi drafting process illustrates how continued conflict 
undermines both constitution-drafting and peacemaking goals, 
causing the merged process to fail.71 
A constitution seeking to achieve immediate security also risks 
creating a political system that is far from ideal.  As Larry 
Diamond, a former senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional 
Government in Iraq, explains:  “[S]ecurity trumps everything else. . 
. .  Without security, a country has nothing but disorder, distrust, 
desperation and despair . . . .  This is why a violence-ridden society 
will turn to almost any political force or formula that is capable of  
providing order, even if it is oppressive.”72  A war-weary 
population may be all too willing to exchange their rights for 
promises of security73 including by establishing a less than fully 
representative government if it appears more likely to secure the 
country.  In a constitution, this exchange is most evident in 
constitutional provisions that grant the executive branch of 
government broad state of emergency powers and/or that allow 
 
69 See Brahimi, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the importance of a successful 
peace process in order to form an effective constitution). 
70 Id. 
71 Failure here is judged according to the criteria for success listed in the 
introduction to Section 2.2. 
72 See Larry Diamond, What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq, in NATION-
BUILDING: BEYOND IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 173, 176 (Francis Fukuyama ed., 2006).  
73 See, e.g., Hallie Ludsin, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: the Palestinian 
Constitutional Drafting Process, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 443, 482 (2005) 
(explaining that people are willing to sacrifice their rights in exchange for security 
during times of conflict or political instability). 
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fundamental rights to be arbitrarily and severely limited to protect 
national security. 
The drafting of India’s Constitution provides an important 
example of how the exchange of rights for security is made in a 
conflict setting, although not in the context of a merged 
constitution-drafting/peacemaking process.74  Following the end 
of British colonialism, the violence of the contested partitioning of 
India and Pakistan, and a communist-led armed rebellion in 
Telangana, India seemed to be functioning in a “de facto” state of 
emergency.75  Feeling insecure, the Constituent Assembly 
constitutionally protected preventive detention as an ordinary law 
enforcement tool.76  Preventive detention permits a person to be 
detained extra-judicially  without charge and without a finding 
of guilt  to prevent a future crime. 
Although fully aware of how preventive detention was used as 
a tool for tyranny under British rule, the Constituent Assembly 
expressly rejected due process guarantees for detainees, seeing 
preventive detention with few safeguards as a necessary evil to 
combat threats to the new state.77  As one participant explained 
during the Assembly debates: 
On occasions like this sympathies of most of us go out to 
the high principles which in the past we proclaimed from 
 
74 This example is useful despite the difference in context as it illustrates the 
problems innate to drafting constitutions during conflicts generally. 
75 See Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive 
Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 311, 324 (2001) (detailing 
the enactment of laws authorizing preventive detention in India following World 
War I and II); see also Ramachandra Guha, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF 
THE WORLD’S LARGEST DEMOCRACY 31–32 (2007) (describing the period of hostility 
and displacement following India’s independence). 
76 See INDIA CONST. art. 22, §3(b) (allowing law enforcement to preventively 
detain a person extra-judicially for up to one-year); see also SOUTH ASIA HUMAN 
RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, NATIONAL SECURITY ACT: OBSCURING THE FLAWS 
IN INDIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURES (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF210.htm (highlighting the 
problematic ubiquity of preventive detention in India).  Under international law, 
preventive detention is permissible only during a declared state of emergency.  
See, e.g., Meenakshi Ganguly, “Everyone Lives in Fear”: Patterns of Impunity in 
Jammu and Kashmir, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sept. 2006, at 64–103. 
77 See SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, supra note 76 
(emphasizing the constitutionality of India’s preventive detention measures). 
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housetops.  But there are other friends who occupy seats of 
authority and responsibility throughout the country.  They 
warn us that the aftermath of war and partition has 
unchained forces which if allowed to gain upper-hand will 
engulf the country in anarchy and ruin.  They therefore 
advocate, that Parliament must be able to pass laws arming. 
[sic] the Executive with adequate powers to check these 
forces of violence, anarchy and disorder. . . .  Many of us are 
not convinced that dire results would necessarily follow the 
adoption of the phrase “due process of law”.  But the 
difficulty is this, that even if we were- to stand for our own 
convictions there is no scope far [sic] experimenting in such 
matters.78 
With their excessive power, government officials have used 
preventive detention freely to suppress opposition, to intimidate 
vulnerable populations, and to hold detainees indefinitely and 
without judicial review.79  The police use preventive detention to 
punish alleged criminals without having to give them their rights.80  
The Supreme Court of India has described the overreliance on 
preventive detention as a threat to democracy, yet its hands are 
tied to prevent it by a constitution drafted amidst violence and 
security fears.81 
 
78 B. M. Gupte, Representative (Bombay), Constituent Assembly of India – 
vol. IX, Sept. 16, 1949, available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in 
/ls/debates/vol9p36a.htm (last visited March 17, 2010). 
79 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INT’L REPORT 2006 (2007) 
(arguing that minority groups like the dalits and adivasis are subjected to 
preventive detention and targeted disproportionately by law enforcement 
officials), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10 
/001/2006/en/59ad70c9-d46f-11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/pol100012006en.pdf; see 
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76, at 64–103 (detailing human rights 
abuses by India’s law enforcement personnel, with a focus on Jammu and 
Kashmir). 
80 See SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, supra note 76 
(noting that preventive detention is regularly used against recidivists, criminally 
accused likely to be granted bail, and participants in organized crime). 
81 See, e.g., Bhut Nath Mete v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 3 S.C.R. 315, 325.  
The potential executive tendency to shy at courts for prosecution of 
ordinary offences and to rely generously on the easier strategy of 
subjective satisfaction is a danger to the democratic way of life.  The 
large number of habeas corpus petitions and the more or less stereotyped 
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In the absence of security, it also may be impossible to build or 
strengthen government institutions sufficiently to establish and 
maintain peace, as constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool 
expects.82  For a constitution to be effective and the rule of law to 
be achieved, the government must determine when the use of force 
is legitimate.  As long as the conflict rages, a government cannot 
protect the population from violence, maintain order and 
guarantee human rights despite constitutional promises.  
Implementing a new constitution without having achieved security 
then sets up the new government for failure, the violence overtly 
denying the legitimacy of the new constitutional institutions and 
limiting their efficacy. 83 
Afghanistan provides an important example of the difficulty 
building constitutional institutions in the midst of conflict.  
Currently, Afghanistan’s constitution-based, formal justice system 
is secondary to the informal, traditional mechanisms for resolving 
disputes  such as shuras and jirgas.84  The formal court system has 
 
grounds of detention and inaction by way of prosecution, induce us to 
voice this deeper concern. 
Id.; see also G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala & Anr, (1966) S.C.R. 44, 599. 
The tendency to treat [matters of preventive detention powers] in a 
somewhat casual and cavalier manner which may conceivably result 
from the continuous use of such unfettered powers, may ultimately pose 
a serious threat to the basic values on which the democratic way of life in 
this country is founded. 
Id. 
82 See Robert I. Rotberg, Discussion Draft: Creating Robust Institutions: 
Preparing Secure Governance Foundations, Research Partnership on Postwar State-
Building (2006); see generally Diamond, supra note 72 (detailing how nation-
building efforts in Afghanistan have been thwarted by lapses in security). 
83 See, e.g., Rotberg, supra note 82, at 2 (“Institutions such as a judiciary, a 
legislature, and even a thoroughly legitimized executive can be created or re-
created in the aftermath of destructive civil war only when strong foundations are 
laid. Such institutions may exist, but never truly function, in the absence of 
widespread security.”). 
84 See John Dempsey & Noah Coburn, Traditional Dispute Resolution and 
Stability in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace: Peace Brief, 2 (2010) 
(underscoring the persistence of traditional tribal judicial avenues in 
Afghanistan); see also Thomas Barfield et al., The Clash of Two Goods: State and Non-
State Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 2 (2006) (“The 
justice system is relatively weak in the urban centers where the central 
government is strongest, and in the rural areas that house approximately 75% of 
the population, functioning courts, police, and prisons are an exception.”). 
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been devastated by decades of violence, which has led a 
monitoring group to conclude that “Afghanistan’s justice system is 
in a catastrophic state of disrepair.”85  It is perceived as corrupt and 
inaccessible; it lacks resources and trained staff, making it unable 
to function in many areas; and it does not have sufficient security 
to work in others.86  The state-run judicial system also feels foreign 
when contrasted with the familiarity of traditional systems of 
justice.87  Evidencing a lack of faith even among government 
officials, a United States Institute of Peace report noted:  
Executive officials in the provinces, provincial, district 
governors, police, and prosecutors tend to bypass the 
courts to settle difficult or important disputes, and many 
local court judges also refer disputes to community-based 
mechanisms for settlement.  Research suggests that 80–90% 
of disputes  criminal and civil  are resolved outside of 
the formal system.88 
Resorting to informal systems of justice, however, is not 
without its drawbacks.  Informal systems cannot guarantee 
equality under the law, and in Afghanistan, are notable for 
excluding women and favoring the powerful.89  Military 
commanders have taken over many of them, undermining their 
traditional character.90  As the primary justice system, the informal 
mechanisms cannot ensure rule of law as they are not accountable 
for applying the constitution or statutory law to disputes, let alone 
consistently. 
The continuing violence directly hampers efforts to reform and 
promote the formal justice system in Afghanistan.  Judges and law 
 
85 See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, ASIA 
REPORT NO. 195, Nov. 17, 2010, at i. 
86 See Dempsey & Coburn, supra note 84, at 2 (affirming that the Taliban 
defines the avenues of judicial recourse in the areas under its control). 
87 Id. at 3. 
88 Barfield et al., supra note 84, at 3. 
89 See Dempsey & Coburn, supra note 84, at 2 (detailing how tribal justice in 
Afghanistan perpetuates tribal values). 
90 See Neamat Nojumi et al., Afghanistan’s Systems of Justice: Formal, 
Traditional, and Customary, FEINSTEIN INT’L FAMINE CTR. 38 (2004) (highlighting 
how Afghanistan’s jirgas and other avenues of traditional dispute resolution have 
been hijacked in the past). 
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enforcement officials often are unwilling to serve outside Kabul 
where they feel insecure, leaving vast areas without a functioning 
court at all.91  Many Afghans have little choice but to turn to the 
Taliban to address their legal disputes in areas not under 
government control.92  The International Crisis Group, an 
independent monitoring group, links the lack of access to the 
justice system to the continuing conflict, reporting that “[f]estering 
grievances at the local level are reinforced by injustice, entrenching 
a culture of impunity that has become a key driver of the 
insurgency.”93 
A shift to rule of law, which can be made only through support 
for the formal justice system, is difficult generally, and made 
nearly impossible during Afghanistan’s internal conflict.  As a 
result, many in the international community are advocating a 
formal role for these traditional systems of dispute resolution,94 
despite the inability to guarantee fundamental rights, equality or 
the consistent application of the law. 
The experiences in Iraq, India and Afghanistan illustrate that 
security is a precondition to drafting a constitution that establishes 
a stable and legitimate foundation for the state.  Yet, constitution-
drafting as a peacemaking tool reverses this order, basing the 
short-and long-term success of peacemaking on the finalization of 
a new constitution.  This inherent sequencing tension destroys any 
assumption of the inherent compatibility of a merged constitution-
drafting/peacemaking process. 
2.2.1.2.  National Identity Over Group Identity 
Constitution-drafting during a conflict raises a second tension 
in the sequencing category, this time with respect to developing a 
national identity.  For a constitution to achieve both peacemaking 
 
91 Id. at 24. 
92 See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 85, at 1 (detailing how the Taliban has 
frequently been empowered by the inefficacy of the formal judicial system). 
93 Id. 
94 See, e.g., Traditional Justice in Afghanistan, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME (Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan), May 2010, 
http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Justice/FactSheetTraditional%20Justice.pdf 
(exemplifying an international organization seeking to integrate traditional 
community actors into a formalized legal system).  
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and constitutional goals, its constituents must be able to unify 
under a national identify that represents who they are as citizens 
and as a political community.  The inherent tension crops up 
because constitution-drafting presupposes a unified national 
identity, but constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool expects 
the constitution to build that national identity.95  Achieving a 
unified identity is extremely unlikely when sectarian or group 
divisions have erupted into ongoing violence.  Constructing a 
national identity requires some trust to act beyond immediate 
group interests to protect longer-term national interests and 
sustain peace; yet, for example, “people might be unlikely to be 
able to think in non-ethnic or even cross-ethnic terms when only 
recently ethnicity might have been a matter of life and death.”96  
The risk of drafting the constitution before unifying behind a 
national identity is that the threat of renewed conflict remains until 
the new identity receives popular support.97 
While the process of establishing a national identity does not 
require homogenizing the population, a weak consensus on that 
identity could entrench divisions based on ethnic, cultural or 
religious characteristics or other factors that helped create the 
conflict.  In a divided political community, each group is likely to 
be working toward its interests alone rather than toward a 
communal vision of the future.  In trying to accommodate 
peacemaking’s immediate needs, constitutions may entrench forms 
of power sharing that reflect those national divisions rather than 
any unity.  In doing so, they may inadvertently “exacerbate fault 
lines, divisions, and tensions in society; entrench conflict-
generating electoral or governance models, or provide a basis for 
contesting the government.”98 
Lebanon provides a particularly distressing example of this 
point.  Twice it has undergone constitutional change in response to 
 
95 See GHAI & GALLI, supra note 6, at 7 (contending that constitutions must 
strive to build upon a political community by bringing diverse communities 
together). 
96 Bettina Scholdan, Democratisation and Electoral Engineering in Post-Ethnic 
Conflict Societies, 7 J. EUR. INST. COMM. & CULTURE  25, 30 (2000) (describing the 
difficulties of establishing democracy and elections in post-conflict societies). 
97 See Lerner, supra note 49, at 7 (pushing for intellectuals to focus on national 
identity in constitution-making for durable and viable constitutions). 
98 See Samuels, supra note 1, at 671. 
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conflict without reaching any consensus on national identity, 
leading to civil war and the continuing risk of violence.  The 
Ottoman Empire ruled Lebanon until its collapse during World 
War I.  After France took control in 1926, a constitution was drafted 
to quell on-going sectarian violence.99  It adopted a power-sharing 
regime that divided power among the different religious sects, 
creating a confessional system to govern Lebanon temporarily until 
some type of national unity could be reached between the 
competing Christian and Muslim communities and the 18 different 
sects that form them.100  Power was split between the Maronite 
Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims, the three largest 
religious communities. 
French control ended in 1943 with power-sharing in full force.  
Violence seemed likely as the Christian population, which at the 
time was in the majority, sought to maintain its links to France and 
the West, while the Muslim population was divided between Arab 
nationalism seeking to link Lebanon to Syria and Lebanese 
nationalism seeking an independent state.101  In 1943, the power-
sharing agreement was renegotiated to avoid civil unrest.  The 
National Pact, an informal constitution-like agreement, dictated the 
division of power in Lebanon that would last until the end of the 
1975 civil war.  It appointed a Christian President, a Sunni Prime 
 
99 See CHARLES WINSLOW, LEBANON: WAR AND POLITICS IN A FRAGMENTED 
SOCIETY 65 (1996); Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, 
Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure, in SUSTAINABLE PEACE: POWER AND 
DEMOCRACY AFTER CIVIL WARS 219, 226 (Philip G. Roeder & Donald Rothchild, 
eds., 2005) (indicating that amidst “communal tensions,” France helped draft a 
constitution aimed at ending a difficult six-year transition period). 
100 See CONSTITUTION OF LEBANON, May 23, 1926, art. 95 (Gabriel M. Bustros 
trans., Bureau of Lebanese & Arab Documentation 1973), available at 
http://www.concourt.am/armenian/legal_resources/world_constitutions/const
it/lebanon/lebann-e.htm (granting equal representation in ministerial and public 
posts to the communities); Zahar, supra note 99, at 226 (describing Article 95 of the 
1926 constitution and its power-sharing regime).  This agreement, along with its 
successor, could be seen as a form of a transitional constitution or an interim 
constitution, as discussed further in Section 3 below. 
101 See Zahar, supra note 99, at 227 (outlining three main nationalist players in 
the fight for independence including Christian nationalism for “French tutelage,” 
Arab nationalism for Lebanon’s integration into Syria, and Lebanese nationalism 
for independence). 
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Minister and a Shiite President of Parliament;102 it also apportioned 
parliamentary representation between the different sects based on 
a 1932 population census, which at the time showed a larger 
Christian majority.103  The National Pact favored the Maronite 
Christians, serving as a source of tension.104  Again, power-sharing 
was intended to be a temporary measure until the communities 
could unify under a national identity that permitted democratic 
governance. 
The National Pact failed to achieve unity and the polarization 
continued.  As the years passed, the Muslim population 
outnumbered the Christian population, making the National Pact 
formula for representation even less fair.  Increasing socio-
economic inequalities between the different communities, and 
interference from Syria, Palestinians and Israel in domestic affairs 
inflamed tensions until Lebanon burst into civil war in 1975.105 
The civil war concluded fifteen years later in 1991 with the 
signing of the Ta’if Agreements, or the Charter of Lebanese 
National Reconciliation.  The Ta’if Agreements included 
constitutional amendments to the power-sharing regime to adjust 
the balance of power between the Christian and Muslim 
populations.106  The power of the Christian president was curtailed 
 
102 See Alexandra R. Harrington, Resurrection from Babel: The Cultural, Political, 
and Legal Status of Christian Communities in Lebanon and Syria and Their Prospects for 
the Future, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217, 229 (2006) (describing the religiously 
diverse composition of important government positions). 
103 See Lebanon Political Profile: Recent History and Relationship with Syria, INT’L 
DEBATES, Jan. 2006, at 4 (January 2006) (averring that the Christian-to-Muslim 
government composition was based on the 1932 census). 
104 See Samir Makdisi & Marcus Marktanner, Trapped By Consociationalism: The 
Case Of Lebanon 3 (Am. Univ. of Beirut Inst. of Finance and Economics, Lecture 
and Working Paper Series No. 1, 2008), available at 
http://wwwlb.aub.edu.lb/~webifeco/downloads/series%201_2008.pdf (“[T]he 
delicate sectarian balance led to the emergence of a weak state that failed to 
implement effective political and administrative programs” and led to 
“entrenched politico-sectarian special interests”); Zahar, supra note 99, at 228 
(explaining that the National Pact created a “ratio of Christian to Muslim 
representatives in Parliament at six to five” favoring specifically Maronite 
Christians over Muslims and other Christian sects such as Greek Orthodox). 
105 See Harrington, supra note 102, at 229 (listing the numerous possible 
causes of the civil war that broke out in 1975). 
106 See id. at 226 (noting that the power-sharing regime changed, giving 
Muslims and Christians parity in Parliament); see also Makdisi & Marktanner, 
supra note 104, at 3 (also explaining that the sectarian power-sharing regime 
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and Christians and Muslims now have equal representation in the 
government, although the Muslim population is estimated to be 
almost two-thirds of the population.107  Again, the confessional 
system of power-sharing was intended as a temporary measure, 
yet the population has yet to unify sufficiently to establish a 
national identity that would make such divisions unnecessary.  
Instead, the gulf between the groups is deepening once more, 
increasing the risks of renewed violence.  Civil war was narrowly 
averted in 2008 as Sunni groups grew insecure with the increasing 
Shiite power in the form of Hezbollah.108 
Critics of the Lebanese power-sharing agreements argue that 
they consolidate sectarian power and the power of the elites within 
them,109 creating a disincentive to a unified national identity.110  
They also create a system in which “[c]itizenship does not exist 
independent of religious affiliation . . . [and] [b]asic rights could 
only be fully accepted within the religious community, as every 
community has to fend for itself on its own.”111  At the same time, 
these power-sharing agreements seem to be the only way to 
achieve immediate peace, placing Lebanon between a rock and a 
hard place.  Blame for this conundrum falls on the failure of peace 
 
changed in many ways including an equal number of Christian and Muslim 
representatives in Parliament). 
107 See Zahar, supra note 99, at 228 (contending that the Maronite control of 
the presidency was counterbalanced by giving Sunnis the office of the 
premiership and many cabinet posts); Lebanon Political Profile: Recent History and 
Relationship with Syria, supra note 103, at 5 (stating that, according to the CIA in 
2005, Lebanon’s population was approximately 3.8 million people, with Muslims 
comprising 59.7 percent of the population). 
108 See Makdisi and Marktanner, supra note 104, at 4 (tracing the influence of 
Hezbollah that nearly caused a civil war in Lebanon); see also, INT’L CRISIS GROUP., 
Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, MIDDLE EAST 
REPORT NO. 96 at 1 (May 26, 2010) (“Of all, the most striking transformation in 
Sunni attitudes since 2005 has been the exacerbation of sectarian feelings and 
hostility toward Shiites, nurtured by deepened regional sectarian divisions 
following the fall of the Iraqi regime.”). 
109 See, e.g., Zahar, supra note 99, at 229 (criticizing the 1943 National Pact 
because “[t]he legislature turned into a private club as leaders promoted their 
protégés.  The elites almost secured a monopoly of representation”). 
110 See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 108, at 7 (quoting a Sunni man 
confused about national identity who opined, “to us, Lebanon remains an 
artificial construct with which we simply could not identify”).  
111 Michael Ellman et al., The Declaration Abroad: A Comparative Perspective, 11 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 163, 182 (1999). 
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negotiations to confront the causes of the sectarian divisions 
directly.112  As long as those underlying causes of conflict remain, it 
may be impossible for groups to unify under a common national 
vision.  Lebanon’s experience exemplifies how constitutional 
negotiations that fail to achieve a national identity not only fail to 
create lasting peace but also exacerbate community divisions and 
undermine the goals of constitutional governance. 
Before embarking on constitution-drafting, it seems imperative 
that a level of peace be maintained.  Security is necessary to build 
trust between conflicting parties.  Increasing levels of security and 
trust then can serve as the basis for reaching a consensus on 
difficult decisions, such as a national identity, that will serve as the 
foundation for loyalty to the constitution and the political 
community as a whole, and for sustainable peace.  If constitution-
drafting is pursued while the conflict continues to rage and 
without appropriate concern for building a national identity, then 
constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool is likely to fail to meet 
two of the four criteria for success listed in the introduction to Part 
2.2:  ending violence and creating a basis for the country to unify.  
The tension created by demanding constitutional change without 
any unity of national purpose and identity only further 
undermines the assumption of compatibility of peacemaking and 
constitution-drafting processes. 
2.2.2.  Timeframe tensions 
A second category of tensions, that emerges when using 
constitution-drafting as a tool for peacemaking, results from the 
need for separate timeframes for accomplishing peace and for 
negotiating and writing a constitution.  Stopping violence is an 
immediate need.  The population and the international community 
expect that peace-makers will work to stop death and destruction 
within a short time span.  In contrast, constitution-drafting is a 
longer-term process that cannot or at least should not be hasty.  
Drafters and the population need time to agree on national 
identity, how the government should function, and a vision for the 
 
112 See Zahar, supra note 99, at 234–35 (contending that the lack of a “stable 
foreign protectorate” and sustained peace obviated the “transition to a 
nonconfessional democracy”).  
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future.  Once that is achieved, then they need time to carefully craft 
a document that implements that consensus. 
On-going violence can pressure drafters to work quickly.  A 
rushed process makes it less likely that drafters will have time to 
consider the impact of their decisions, which may have unintended 
consequences on the reconstructed state or place inappropriate 
limits on the substance of the constitution.  It also could make it 
extremely difficult to reach a meaningful consensus on national 
identity, which, as the previous section explained, could lead to 
renewed conflict.  Furthermore, harried and hurried drafters may 
adopt ambiguous or poorly worded provisions that could spark 
renewed conflict.  If parties intended different interpretations of 
provisions that address the underlying source of conflict, the group 
disappointed with the government’s choice of interpretations may 
feel betrayed and compelled to return to violence.113 
Again, the drafting experience in Iraq highlights how 
constitution-drafting during a conflict can all too easily fail to 
achieve peace or constitutional goals because of inherent tensions 
in the merged process.  Iraqi drafters faced enormous US pressure 
to finish their drafting process according to the deadline set by the 
US-imposed Interim Constitution.114  As described above, Sunni 
drafters were added to the drafting process only a month before 
completion.  While their participation was considered imperative, 
to meet their deadline, the Kurdish and Shiite drafters bypassed 
their Sunni counterparts on contested issues, conducting private 
meetings to finalize the draft.115  While, ultimately, the constitution 
was adopted through a popular referendum, the vast majority of 
 
113 See Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 28, 31–32 
(describing the difficulties in Nepal caused by the major conflict between different 
regions of the country, and discussing how ambiguity in a Constitution could lead 
to conflict and violence in the future). 
114 See Mona Iman, Draft Constitution Gained, but an Important Opportunity Was 
Lost, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE: PEACE BRIEF, Oct. 2005 at 1 (describing the rushed 
constitutional process as contributing to the discontent in an already polarized 
Iraqi society); see, e.g., Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR, July 
27, 2005, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec05/iraq_7-
27.html (discussing the obstacles facing the creation of Iraq’s Constitution 
including the time deadline, the effects of the insurgency, and the power division 
within federalism). 
115 See Morrow, supra note 58, at 9 (describing the minimal role Sunni 
politicians played in drafting the Iraqi Constitution). 
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Sunnis rejected the draft.116  Their alienation in the drafting process 
is believed to have added to Sunni isolation and therefore the 
insurgency that raged for many years after.  Mona Iman of the 
United States Institute of Peace expressly blames the “rushed 
constitutional process” for the constitution’s failure to achieve 
peace, describing: 
Iraqi constitution-making always required a complex three-
way negotiation in circumstances where nothing—not even 
a residual shared Iraqi identity—could be taken for granted 
. . . complexity of the negotiations, and the backdrop of 
increasingly sectarian violence in Iraq meant that the 
meetings increasingly resembled peace talks, where peace 
was clearly elusive, and would require additional time to 
achieve.117 
With more time, Iman argues, the drafting process could “have 
commanded greater Sunni Arab support, with consequent gains 
for governmental legitimacy and peace in Iraq.”118 
Because stopping violence will always take precedence over an 
amorphous need for reflection over constitutional provisions, 
pressure for a hasty constitution-drafting process is likely to be 
immense.  A hasty process weakens the chances of ending 
violence, establishing a unified identity, and creating a constitution 
that will meet the current and future needs and interests of the 
population, which are three of the four criteria needed for the 
success of constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool, as described 
in the introduction to Part 2.2.  The inherent time-frame tension 
only further undermines the assumption of compatibility of a 
merged constitution-drafting/peacemaking process. 
2.2.3.  Tensions between short- and long-term goals 
One of the biggest potential barriers to relying on constitution-
drafting as a peacemaking tool is the tension it creates between the 
short-term goals of immediately stopping violence and the longer-
 
116 See id. at 2–3 (discussing the widespread opposition to the Constitution by 
Sunni Arabs). 
117 Iman, supra note 114, at 3. 
118 Id. at 1. 
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term goals of constitutions.119  To accomplish the cessation of 
violence, peace-makers typically need to react crisis to crisis, 
solving immediate problems.120  These crisis-management 
solutions may limit the options open to negotiators to address the 
long-term needs or goals of the population.  The conflict also may 
simply narrow the constitutional agenda, as the underlying issues 
of the conflict will receive the most attention.121  These issues may 
be the most important to resolving the conflict but may not address 
vital matters related to establishing a stable foundation for the 
state. 
A related concern is whether the constitution will be focused so 
heavily on crisis management and the particular circumstances of 
the conflict, that the constitution will fail to address the fact that 
the constituency’s needs are likely to change once peace arrives.122  
What drafters and society feel they need now may not be what 
they will want or need in the future, once they can think beyond 
security matters.123  For example, as discussed in Part 2.2.1.1, a 
besieged population is likely to trade rights for security.  Similarly, 
 
119 See, e.g., PARIS & SISK, supra note 7, at 4–5 (discussing the potential conflict 
between addressing short-term needs, such as ending violence, and addressing 
long-term goals of state building); John Paul Lederach, Beyond Violence: Building 
Sustainable Peace, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE 239–40 (Eugene 
Weiner ed., 1998) (arguing that peace-building needs a design that takes into 
account immediate needs, while also considering the future); Bell, supra note 15, at 
399 (discussing the value of precision in peace agreements for the short-term, and 
its limitations for the long-term). 
120 See, e.g., PARIS & SISK, supra note 7, at 4–5 (discussing the tendency to 
address short-term goals first in order to end violence immediately); Andrew 
Reynolds, Constitutional Medicine, 16 J. DEMOCRACY 54, 59 (2005) (stating that 
drafters may fail to recognize that short-term solutions to a crisis may be 
detrimental in the long-term); Lederach, supra note 119, at 239 (discussing the 
emphasis solely on narrowly defined, short-term goals such as the cessation of 
violence during crises). 
121 See Ghai, supra note 12, at 3 (asserting that constitutions may end 
immediate violence but not solve the underlying reasons for conflict); Workshop on 
Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 25 (stating the problems and risks 
associated with creating a constitution and resolving a conflict simultaneously). 
122 See Ivan Simonovic, Post-Conflict Peace Building: The New Trends, 31 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 251, 256 (2003) (explaining that people have different needs during 
conflict-resolution and peace-building stages versus non-crisis stages). 
123 See Ludsin, supra note 73, at 482 (stating that a constitution created by 
Palestinians now may not reflect their wants and needs in the future when their 
society is more stable and free from occupation and violence). 
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societies tend to grow more traditional during conflict, seeking 
comfort in tradition as a balance to the upheaval in their lives.124  
As a result, a more conservative constitution could be adopted 
during a conflict than would be acceptable during peace.125  
Societies also may grow more insular as they feel more insecure.126  
In cases of conflicts involving identity, societal divisions are likely 
to make a drafting process more difficult or lead to a constitution 
that entrenches those divisions,127 a point stressed in Part 2.2.1.2. 
The tension between long-term and short-term goals and needs 
is particularly problematic for non-violent groups who are asked to 
put their rights and concerns aside in favor of a document that can 
serve as a peace treaty.  For example, it is not uncommon for 
women to be forced to push aside their equality demands for the 
sake of other goals deemed more important—such as nationalism 
or ending a conflict.128  Tuning out the voices of non-violent groups 
can create new conflicts or result in continued harm to those 
groups.  Constitution-drafting during a conflict, therefore, limits 
the likelihood that the constitution/peace treaty will respond to 
the needs and interests of the population as a whole. 
The drafting process of Third Revised Draft Constitution of the 
State of Palestine (Draft Constitution), the most current draft, 
illustrates several of these problems, particularly the damage 
caused to longer-term constitutional goals.  The U.S. government 
pushed heavily for this draft as part of the process of peace as 
envisaged in the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent 
Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, or Roadmap 
for Peace.129  The Draft Constitution reflects the interests of the two 
 
124 See id. (explaining that society generally becomes more conservative and 
culturally traditional during times of crisis and upheaval). 
125 See id. (discussing how a constitution created before statehood would 
likely be more conservative than one that is created during times of peace because 
of society’s belief that more security is needed). 
126 See Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 25 
(discussing how insecurity causes people to draw inwards and communicate only 
with others who they know well). 
127 See id. (stating that, during insecure times, different groups become more 
divided and sectarianism increases). 
128 See, e.g., Ludsin, supra note 73, at 467 (discussing the difficulty certain 
societies have in balancing nationalist and women’s rights goals). 
129 See NATHAN J. BROWN, PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR POL’Y & SURV. RES., THE 
THIRD DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE: TRANSLATION AND 
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dominant political parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT)—the secular Fatah party, which controls the West Bank, and 
the fundamentalist Islamist group Hamas, which controls the Gaza 
Strip.  At the time, both territories were under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority and Fatah leader Yassir Arafat. 
Much of the Draft Constitution reflects the bargaining between 
the two parties, who were able to unite behind nationalist goals.  
This unity was fragile130 and the provisions of the final draft reflect 
the tense bargaining between these two parties to the exclusion of 
other groups.131  At the time of the drafting, Hamas increasingly 
was threatening Fatah’s power, forcing enormous compromises.  
Popular support for Hamas stemmed in large part from the 
apparent corruption of Fatah as well as Hamas’ stance against 
Israel,132 rather than from its religious views.133  Yet its religious 
views dominate the draft constitution as reflected in the extent of 
constitutional protection of Islam in governance.134 
Women had very little influence in the drafting process135 and 
have repeatedly been forced to subordinate their goal of equality to 
ensure the appearance of Palestinian unity.136  They suffer severe 
 
COMMENTARY 1 (2003) (stating that the United States and President George W. 
Bush pressured the Palestinians to create a new constitution through public 
announcements during international debates).  While the drafting of a 
constitution is considered part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the 
constitution itself is not a peace treaty.  Despite this difference in context, it 
illustrates how tension often erupts in a conflict setting. 
130 Since then, Hamas has ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza 
Strip, controlling the area within the limits of occupation. 
131 See Ludsin, supra note 73, at 479 (discussing how certain groups, such as 
women’s rights groups and groups to the left of Fatah, were excluded in the 
constitution-drafting process). 
132 See id. at 486 (stating that Hamas receives widespread support for its fight 
against corruption and Israel). 
133 Many Palestinians hope that political Islam can succeed where the secular 
movement has apparently failed: in ending the Israeli occupation and establishing 
a stronger economy and greater security. 
134 See THIRD REVISED DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE 2003, 
art. 5 (stating that Islam is the official religion of Palestine); id. art. 7 (declaring that 
the principles of Islamic Shari’a law will be used as a major source for legislation). 
135 See Ludsin, supra note 73, at 476 (discussing the lack of female members on 
the Constitutional Committee and the little influence they have on the constitution 
drafting process). 
136 See Hallie Ludsin, Women and the Draft of the Constitution of Palestine 49 
(2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the common 
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discrimination under Shari’a family law as interpreted in the 
OPT,137 yet the Draft Constitution expressly protects this law.138  
While there are specific provisions seemingly securing women’s 
rights, the constitutional guarantee of religious control over 
personal status law potentially wholly undermines them.  For 
example, under the reciprocal nature of Shari’a law, a woman is 
entitled to receive financial maintenance from her husband only as 
long as she is obedient to him.139  Obedience requires the wife to 
obtain her husband’s permission to leave her home.140  In the OPT, 
this requirement effectively has been interpreted to allow a woman 
to work and to travel only with the permission of her husband. 141  
The Draft Constitution guarantees the rights to equality under the 
law, freedom of movement and work,142 yet a woman could be 
punished for exercising those rights. 
While there is little doubt that much of the Palestinian 
population supports Shari’a law’s domination over family law, that 
support may wane when occupation ends.  Should this occur, the 
Draft Constitution effectively ties the hands of legislators who 
could adopt a secular personal status law only through a super-
 
view that the struggle for women’s rights is often seen as less important than the 
“nationalist agenda”). 
137 See id. at 29 (describing the unique problems Muslim women face in some 
societies, often stemming from the general requirement of obedience to their 
husbands). 
138 See THIRD REVISED DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE, supra 
note 134, art. 7 (“The principles of Islamic Shari’a are a major source for 
legislation.”). 
139 See Ludsin, supra note 136, at 29 (explaining how the requirement of 
obedience often results in wives having severely restricted mobility and 
employment opportunities). 
140 See id. at 126 (describing the restrictions on movement for married women 
living under Shari’a law, and the particular importance of freedom of movement 
for Palestinian women). 
141 See LYNN WELCHMAN, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: TEXT AND PRACTICE IN 
PALESTINE 115 (1999) (explaining restraints upon a wife’s ability to work without 
her husband’s explicit or implied consent); Ludsin, supra note 136, at 127 
(explaining that, even in the face of eased travel restrictions, women need to 
obtain permission from their husbands, fathers, or brothers before using their 
passports). 
142 See THIRD REVISED DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE, supra 
note 134, art. 19 (“Palestinians are equal before the law.”); id. art. 31 (“Citizens 
shall have the right to choose their place of residence and to travel within the state 
of Palestine.”); id. art. 51 (“Employment is a right of all citizens.”). 
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majority support for a constitutional amendment.143  By drafting a 
constitution during a conflict, women risk long lasting and severe 
harm that may have been averted if they had greater opportunity 
to participate in the process.144 
Using constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool subordinates 
long-term constitutional needs and interests to short-term peace 
goals.  In doing so, the process risks entrenching societal divisions, 
limiting the options for political change, establishing a weaker 
constitutional foundation, and failing to address fully the current 
and future needs of the whole population.  This inherent tension 
increases the risk that constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool 
will fail to achieve the legitimacy of constitution, will build only a 
weak national unity, will fail to respond to the needs and concerns 
of the whole of the population, and will cycle society back into 
violent conflict.  The increased risk of any of these outcomes 
underscores the dangers of simply assuming the compatibility of 
the goals and needs of constitution-drafting and peacemaking. 
2.2.4.  Tensions over participation in drafting 
The last apparent tension created when constitution-drafting is 
used as a peacemaking tool described in this Article arises from the 
conflict between the process requirements for sound constitution-
drafting and the different needs of the process for establishing 
peace.  It is difficult to overestimate the importance of process in 
constitution-drafting to a population’s acceptance of a new 
constitution.  A faulty process could lead to a lack of faith in the 
constitution and a lack of trust in the institutions it creates, 
undermining all of the goals of constitution-drafting.145  Process is 
all the more important in conflict situations as it could either 
achieve the peacemaking goals or ultimately lead to further 
polarization and violence.  As Widner explains, this process: 
 
143 See Ludsin, supra note 73, at 492 (stating that two-thirds of the legislature 
would be needed to amend the Constitution and “remove power over personal 
status law from religious authority”). 
144 It is, of course, wholly possible that women would have been excluded 
from a post-conflict constitution-drafting process; nevertheless, drafting during a 
state of conflict ensured women’s exclusion from the process.  
145 See generally Samuels, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the process of 
constitution-drafting will ultimately make a dramatic impact on whether a 
democratic transition is successful). 
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exercises both an indirect effect on violence, by shaping 
who has a voice in choosing the substantive terms, and a 
direct effect, by influencing senses of inclusiveness or levels 
of compromise, for example.  Procedural choices help 
decide who has a chance to speak, the range of community 
interests taken into account, feelings of trust and inclusion, 
the balance between quiet persuasion and grandstanding, 
and the willingness to compromise.146 
If some or all of a population deems the drafting process 
illegitimate, the constitution is unlikely to achieve either 
peacemaking or constitution-drafting goals. 
Perhaps the single-most important element of the process in 
determining whether a population and warring parties will accept 
constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool and/or the 
constitution as a peace treaty is inclusiveness.  Who serves as the 
negotiators—how they are chosen, whose interests are represented, 
who has the opportunity to participate or, conversely, who is 
excluded from the process—all determine the likelihood of success 
of the peacemaking/constitution-drafting process.147  A study of 
twelve constitution-drafting processes showed that “[a]n 
unrepresentative or imposed constitution created or aggravated 
dissent and political tensions, whereas a representative 
constitution building process provided a forum for the negotiation 
of solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to violence, 
or for a negotiated transition from an authoritarian regime.”148  
Inclusiveness is particularly sensitive in conflicts involving identity 
because the underlying source of conflict in large part is a minority 
group’s feeling of exclusion.149  The Iraqi example, described in 
Parts 2.2.1.1. and 2.2.2.,  highlights this point.  The exclusion of 
Sunni voices set up the drafting-process for failure, ensuring that 
 
146 Widner, supra note 1, at 1. 
147 See, e.g., PAUL R. WILLIAM, PUBLIC INT’L LAW & POL’Y GROUP., THE 
CONSTITUTION MAKING PROCESS 9, 30 (2006) (underscoring that the inclusiveness of 
the constitution-drafting process bears on its legitimacy). 
148 Samuels, supra note 2, at 29. 
149 See Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, And Transitional Justice: 
Lessons From South Africa And Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 58 (2004) (contending 
that ethnic conflicts are often the result of exclusion, and that constitutions must 
rectify this shortcoming by enhancing participation and inclusion).   
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the constitution would neither gain legitimacy nor serve as an 
effective peace treaty for the population engaging in the 
insurgency. 
Ideally, constitution-drafters should represent all segments and 
groups within society to ensure that most people’s interests are 
heard and discussed during the drafting stage.  They should be 
elected or at least chosen by the democratic representatives of the 
population.150  Realistically, drafting during a conflict may severely 
limit the choice of drafters to negotiators representing the warring 
parties.151  While constitution-drafting requires broad participation 
to achieve constitutional goals and legitimacy, peace negotiations 
are generally restricted to leaders within the warring groups, as 
they are the ones needed to accomplish a cease-fire and security.152 
Using fighters from warring groups as drafters could damage 
both the substance and the legitimacy of the constitution without 
necessarily lessening the risk of violence.153  Fighters are unlikely to 
have the “expertise . . . or sometimes even the will necessary to 
design long-term constitutions and consequent institutional reform 
in all their value-driven complexity.”154  Their focus is much more 
likely to be on short-term political gains that make it worthwhile to 
relinquish the fight rather than on long-term political needs of a 
functioning, effective and representative state.155  The fear is that 
the constitution will reflect the balance of power between these 
 
150 See, e.g., WILLIAM, supra note 147, at 4 (highlighting the need for 
constitution drafters to be representative of the population as a whole). 
151 See Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 30 
(suggesting that “militarized factions will dominate” any agreements during 
conflicts). 
152 See id. (“By definition, stopping violence gives primacy to groups that can 
organize military force.”). 
153 Fighters are not alone in wreaking havoc in merged constitution-
drafting/peace processes.  Many of the examples provided in this Article 
highlight a pivotal role of international or foreign pressure in causing the tensions 
to erupt.  While there is little question that such pressure is highly problematic, 
undue international interference is not necessarily inherent to constitution-
drafting during conflict and therefore is not discussed in this Article. 
154 Bell, supra note 15, at 399.  See also Workshop on Constitution Building 
Processes, supra note 5, at 25 (“[P]eace agreements are concluded by people who 
usually understand the immediate political context well but may not understand 
the longer-term legal ramifications of constitutional provisions they advocate.”). 
155 Colombia provides a tragic example of this dynamic, as described below. 
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warring parties or serve as a division of spoils between them.156  
These concerns raise the possibility that the basis for the consensus 
between warring factions will stop far short of creating a fair and 
representative government and possibly spark new violence.157 
Relying on negotiators from warring factions as drafters also 
risks that the political extreme will be heard more loudly than 
more moderate groups.  Their threats of violence may allow them 
to receive unfair constitutional concessions.158  Failure to make 
those concessions could renew or aggravate the violence.  
Additionally, new groups may enter the violent fray or threaten to 
do so to ensure a voice in the process.159 
The inherent distrust between warring parties also risks 
creating an inflexible constitution unable to meet society’s needs.  
Negotiators for warring groups will be inclined to draft detailed 
provisions to protect their interests as fully as possible.160  Detailed 
provisions are not always ideal as they may be too rigid to 
accommodate the long-term needs and interests of the broader 
population.  When parties cannot reach a consensus, which is 
likely with respect to particularly contentious issues, drafters are 
prone to adopt ambiguous provisions whose substance ultimately 
will be determined by the legislature or the courts.161  On the one 
 
156 See Teitel, supra note 18, at 2052 (describing what Teitel considers the 
“realist” view of modern constitutions); Samuels, supra note 1, at 670 (arguing that 
constitution-building must be inclusive to avoid powerful factions splitting 
control over populations that may have been excluded in the process). 
157 See, e.g., GHAI & GALLI, supra note 6, at 7 (urging that political community 
must be created through consensus among diverse groups). 
158 See generally Maley, supra note 55, at 686–87 (highlighting the existence of 
“spoilers” in the peace process who are unrelenting in their demands, resorting to 
destructive means when necessary). 
159 See Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 25 
(outlining the main risks in forming a constitution, including the possibility of 
new opposition groups emerging and demanding a voice). 
160 See Bell, supra note 15, at 392 (suggesting that groups of individuals will 
often resort to detail-oriented constitutions to contract with one another instead of 
creating constitutions that involve a social contract between the individual and 
the state).   
161 See, e.g., Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 31–32 
(observing that when “differences are intractable,” negotiators will insert 
ambiguous language to “punt” to the courts and postpone the debate); Bell, supra 
note 15, at 398 (stating that constitution-drafters use ambiguity to reach agreement 
between opposing factions, citing cases in several countries). 
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hand, ambiguous provisions may be the only way to break a dead-
lock in negotiations.162  They may provide more time for a 
consensus to be reached between the groups in the future.  On the 
other hand, these ambiguous provisions could do little more than 
delay the conflict.163 
The legitimacy of the constitution suffers greatly when drafters 
are drawn predominantly from the warring groups.  Relying on 
fighters as drafters risks the impression that the negotiators are 
“unrepresentative, corrupt—or worse—criminal.”164  The excluded 
population is likely to feel that the constitution protects warring 
group interests and rewards them for their violence.165 
The groups most in danger of exclusion are women, non-
violent groups and traditionally powerless groups.  Women 
historically have been excluded from most peace-processes, 
including constitution-drafting processes.166  They are less likely to 
serve as negotiators or drafters because of perceptions that they are 
not the leaders in the conflict and are not serving as fighters.167  The 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 to assert 
the importance of including women in peace processes,168 yet 
 
162 See Bell, supra note 15, at 398 (explaining that the ambiguous language 
enables agreement and allows groups to agree to a constitution that may build 
identity and statehood). 
163 See, e.g., Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 32 
(concluding that eventually “down the road” opposing parties may feel “duped” 
and “[c]onflict may break out again”).  See infra Part 3.2 for a description of how 
this occurred in Nepal’s ongoing constitution-drafting process. 
164 PARIS & SISK, supra note 7, at 6. 
165 See, e.g., Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 31 
(advising drafters to be careful with sunset clauses that may make former warring 
groups appear to be “victors” waiting to take power again in the future); 
discussion infra Part 3.2 of Afghanistan. 
166 See, e.g., U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.realizingrights.org/pdf/UNIFEM_handout_Women_in_peace_proc
esses_Brief_April_20_2009.pdf (showing that over the past eight years there has 
been little increase of participation by women in peace negotiations). 
167 See Swanee Hunt, The Critical Role Of Women Waging Peace, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 557, 557 (2003) (arguing that women are seen as victims in war and 
are left out of the negotiation process, resulting in men doing most of the fighting, 
as well as the negotiating for peace). 
168 S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000). 
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women continue to remain underrepresented as negotiators.  The 
effect is that they struggle to have their voices heard as their 
country is being redesigned.  Their concerns are “likely to be 
ignored or bargained away at the first step of the negotiation 
process,”169 in large part because of the perception that their 
concerns are not political.170  As described in Part 2.3, often they are 
asked to put aside their concerns in favor of interests deemed more 
pressing.171  As the Palestinian example shows, the end result may 
be that women find that the Constitution does not respond to their 
needs and interests, leaving them with few enforceable rights. 
Non-violent groups also typically find themselves excluded 
from negotiations; although in the case of Iraq, the most violent 
minority group was excluded.172  These groups are likely to feel 
that the constitution imposes rules on them rather than represents 
their interests, resulting in the failure of the goals of constitution-
drafting.173  It also can result in the failure of peacemaking goals as 
 
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the 
importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts 
for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need 
to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
Id. 
169 Hunt, supra note 167, at 561. 
170 See Felicity Hill, Women at the Peace Table, in Conference On “Building 
Capacities for Peacekeeping and Women’s Dimensions in Peace Processes”: Joint 
European Union-Latin American and the Caribbean Conference in Santiago, Chile 
87–88 (Nov. 4–5, 2002), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int 
/files/resources/40F62D296AAB8F2AC1256D17004688ED-geo-gender-nov02.pdf 
(stating that one of the challenges of allowing women to participate in peace 
negotiations is that they are not considered a political constituency and, therefore, 
that their issues are not political).   
171 See id. (highlighting that integration of women into the “culture and 
network of politics” would disrupt negotiations if women’s “issues [were] 
considered at the decision making table”). 
172 See CLIVE BALDWIN ET AL., MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L., MINORITY RIGHTS: 
THE KEY TO CONFLICT PREVENTION 16 (2007) (observing that concentrated groups 
“actively involved in armed conflict” have dominated peace negotiations, 
rendering most other groups largely unable to participate).  
173 See Gross, supra note 149, at 58 (arguing that engendering a “sense of 
sharing in the endeavor . . . and the actual creation of a constitution” is essential to 
“ensur[ing] that previously excluded groups will not feel the new [constitution 
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the exclusion of any group could trigger new violence involving 
different parties. 174  A well-designed drafting process, therefore, 
requires “a careful balance . . . [to] be struck between bringing into 
the political process existing actors who control the means of 
violence and the gradual enfranchisement of other interest groups 
and broader society.”175  Unfortunately, nothing requires the 
warring parties to agree to an inclusive process, and they are 
unlikely to do so if they think it will harm their interests. 
Organizing true public participation in the process is also 
particularly difficult during a conflict.  Public participation is 
necessary for creating a truly representative process and is crucial 
to the legitimacy of the constitution.176  Lack of security may make 
it impossible for the public to sit in on discussions or voice their 
concerns.  Security threats encompass the danger in moving from 
place to place as well as specific threats to anyone who speaks out 
against the interests of one of the warring groups.  Exclusion of the 
public also misses a valuable opportunity to educate the 
population about the goals of constitutions and about the draft 
provisions themselves.177 
Colombia’s experience in the effort to use constitutional change 
to quell violence between its main political parties exemplifies the 
tension caused when drafters/negotiators are chosen 
predominantly from warring parties.  Control over the Colombian 
government from the nineteenth century until the mid-1940s was 
tensely divided between the Conservative parties, who typically 
won elections under the 1886 constitution, and the liberal parties.178  
 
has] been imposed by the main power holders, but . . . instead emerged through a 
participatory process”). 
174 See BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 172, at 5 (noting that minorities’ exclusion 
from participating in the political process may push minority groups to resort to 
violence in order to obtain their needs). 
175 Ghani et al., supra note 17, at 109. 
176 See Ludsin, supra note 73, at 477 (contending that public participation in 
constitution drafting is vital to a constitution’s standing as legitimate and a 
representation of the collective public will at large rather than the will of an 
individual ruler). 
177 See id. (“Public participation in drafting . . . [serves to] educat[e] society 
about the goals of the constitution and the individual provisions.”).  
178 See Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis Of The 
Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 23, 27–28 (2000) (describing the 
struggle for power between Conservatives, who typically controlled the 
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The political clashes between the two parties erupted into extreme 
violence during the period named “La Violencia” in the mid 1940s 
during which an estimated 180,000–200,000 people were killed in 
fighting.179  In a coup in 1953, the military took control of the 
government to end the conflict.180 
In 1957, the two parties were able to unite to avoid further 
military control and to prevent a growing threat to their hegemony 
from communist parties.181  They adopted the National Front to 
divide power between them.182  The National Front guaranteed 
that Colombia’s presidency would rotate between the Liberal and 
Conservative parties and that the seats in the legislature would be 
evenly divided between them, excluding all other political groups, 
for a period of 16 years.183  They effectively formed a “monopoly of 
 
government, and the Liberals, who often resorted to violence); Polity IV Country 
Report 2008: Colombia, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE 2 (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Colombia2008.pdf (explaining that a two-
party system pervaded Colombia from the mid-nineteenth century until sometime 
after the onset of the La Violencia period). 
179 See Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding The Fate Of Complementarity: A 
Colombian Case Study, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 63–64 (2009) (estimating that 
200,000 deaths resulted from the La Violencia period of 1948–1953); COLOMBIA: A 
COUNTRY STUDY 37–39 (Dennis M. Hanratty et al. eds., 1990) (documenting the 
period of La Violencia in Colombia); see also Catalina Diaz, Colombia’s Bid for 
Justice and Peace, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE: STUDIES ON 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 469, 471 (Kai Ambos et. al. eds., 
2009) (estimating that 180,000 persons died during La Violencia from 1946–1965); 
NATALIA SPRINGER, COLOMBIA: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT—POLICIES AND PROBLEMS, 1 
(2006) (estimating that 200,000 Columbians died as a result of La Violencia).   
180 See Easterday, supra note 179, at 64 (detailing how La Violencia concluded 
in a coup led by General Pinilla) 
181 See FORREST HYLTON, EVIL HOUR IN COLOMBIA 52–53 (2006) (noting that by 
1957, the Conservatives and Liberals joined out of necessity and formed the 
National Front). 
182 See Sergio González Sandoval, The Colombian Experience in the Area of 
Protection of the Freedom of Religion, 2009 BYU L. REV. 651, 655–56 (2009) (noting 
that the bipartisan National Front agreement arose from “an atmosphere of 
reconciliation” between the Liberals and Conservatives to avert further rule by 
military dictatorship); see also COLOMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 179, at xxv 
(detailing the origins and structure of the National Front “power-sharing 
agreement” struck between the Conservatives and Liberals). 
183 See Easterday, supra note 179, at 64 (“Under the National front, the parties 
alternated control over the presidency and maintained parity in control over 
legislative and executive offices to the exclusion of other political parties.”); see 
also BENJAMIN KEEN & KEITH HAYNES, 2 A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 473 (2003) 
(detailing the origins of the National Front). 
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shared power,” guaranteeing their power as elites.184  The 
population voted in favor of the National Front and its consequent 
change to the 1886 Constitution in hopes that it would maintain 
some level of peace.185 
Excluded from this bargaining process were the poor, landless 
and communist parties dissatisfied with elite rule and its failure to 
address their socio-economic concerns.186  The excluded groups 
began a guerrilla war in the early-to-mid-1960s against the now 
politically aligned Liberal and Conservative parties: 
While [the National Front] secured peace between the two 
main political camps, it did so at the expense of other 
politics.  The guerrillas identify themselves as a reaction to 
this restricted system . . . .  [T]he National Front was at a 
minimum perceived as exclusionary and incapable of 
channeling these particular group demands.187 
According to a 2008 Amnesty International report, in the twenty 
years prior to 2008, 70,000 people had been killed and three to four 
million had been displaced; during the forty years prior to the 
report, between 15,000 and 20,000 people had been forcibly 
disappeared; in the ten years prior to its report, 20,000 had been 
kidnapped or taken hostage.188  These deaths were the result of 
fighting between guerrillas, paramilitary “self-defense” groups, the 
military, and drug cartels.189  Much of the violence has its roots in 
 
184 See KEEN & HAYNES, supra note 183, at 473 (describing the National Front’s 
monopoly on the political process).  
185 See COLOMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 179 at 41–42 (stating that in 
1957, “Colombians voted overwhelmingly . . . to approve [the agreement 
establishing the National Front] as amendments to the Constitution of 1886”). 
186 See Jose E. Arvelo, Note, International Law and Conflict Resolution in 
Colombia: Balancing Peace and Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 411, 416 (2006) (noting that in spite of the National Front 
Agreement, “the social conflict regarding agrarian interests in the rural areas 
continued”). 
187 Esquirol, supra note 178, at 28–29. 
188 AMNESTY INT’L, ‘LEAVE US IN PEACE!’: TARGETING CIVILIANS IN COLOMBIA’S 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 7 (2008). 
189 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., COLOMBIA CONFLICT HISTORY 1 (2011) (describing the 
rise of guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and drug cartels in the years and decades 
that followed formation of the National Front, which had concentrated power in 
the political elite). 
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the La Violencia period and the failures of the National Front 
settlement.190  Colombia provides a particularly tragic example of 
how allowing warring parties alone to draft constitutional change 
can lead to the appearance of division of spoils and renewed 
violence, this time with new combatants drawn from excluded 
political forces. 
Overall, constitution-making during a conflict requires placing 
leaders of warring groups as negotiators/drafters of the 
constitution.  Doing so threatens the legitimacy of the drafting 
process and the document it creates as some or all of the 
population may feel excluded by the process.  It also risks creating 
an overly inflexible and/or ambiguous constitution that does not 
serve the needs and interests of the broader population and that 
could inflame tensions and therefore, violence.  The inherent 
tension caused by peacemaking needs for warring party 
participation in constitution-drafting could lead the merged tool to 
fail to meet all four criteria for success as it risks renewing violence, 
maintaining severe societal divisions, addressing only immediate 
concerns, and depriving the new constitution of legitimacy. 
2.3. What if the process fails? 
The expectation for constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool 
is that the drafting process and constitution will bring peace and 
stability to a nation in conflict by providing warring parties with a 
forum to negotiate a binding document that creates a foundation 
for a peaceful, stable state.  A closer examination of the tensions 
caused by the differing goals and needs of constitution-drafting 
and peacemaking undermines this expectation.  Drafting a 
constitution during a conflict risks a document that is hastily 
drafted; reflects a shallow basis for unity; serves mostly short-term 
peace interests; is reactionary or inappropriately conservative; 
entrenches religious, cultural or ethnic divisions; does not fully 
 
190 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 188, at 5 (describing contemporary guerilla 
groups that owe their origins to the La Violencia period of the 1950s); see also, 
SPRINGER, supra note 179, at 1 (detailing the social consequences of La Violencia 
and remarking that a “durable legacy of [La Violencia] was the creation of 
memories of hate, desire for vengeance and lasting distrust among the victims 
and their descendants”); Diaz, supra note 179, at 471 (stating that the modern 
Colombian armed conflict “finds its roots in” La Violencia). 
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protect human rights; lacks legitimacy; and ultimately sparks 
renewed violence.  These risks are inherent in a merged 
constitution-drafting/peacemaking process, although the negative 
outcomes are not necessarily inevitable.  By any measure of 
success—and certainly by using the four criteria that seem to 
underlie most measures—if any of those negative outcomes arise, 
neither constitution-drafting nor a resulting constitution can 
succeed fully, if at all, at their peacemaking or constitutional goals. 
This raises the next question:  what are the consequences if the 
process and constitution fail to attain national unity, legitimacy 
and/or adherence to peaceful dispute-resolution mechanisms or 
does not address the current and future needs and interests of the 
whole population?  At its mildest, failures in the process and/or 
constitution could mean that some or all of a population suffers 
under a constitutional regime it does not support.  In some 
instances, different groups will be deprived of their rights or suffer 
from an exchange of security for rights, as in India or as is likely in 
the Palestinian Territories.  Alternatively, poorly drafted or weak 
constitutional provisions could create a paper constitution, which 
means that some or all of the constitution will not be fully 
enforced. 
Any of these outcomes could have a detrimental effect on the 
growth of constitutionalism in the conflict-plagued country.  
“Constitutionalism is the societal acceptance of the rule of law 
under the constitution.”191  It establishes constitutional supremacy 
in setting rules for governance and for protecting human rights.192  
Richard A. Rosen identifies constitutionalism as perhaps the key 
ingredient to the success of a constitution:  “If constitutionalism is 
sufficiently imbued in a society, even a faulty constitution can 
survive, by amendment or adaptation.  If it is absent, the most 
carefully crafted constitutional document is virtually worthless.”193  
 
191 Richard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism and the Eritrean 
Experience, 24 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 263, 276 (1998). 
192 PIERRE J. J. OLIVIER, Constitutionalism in the New South Africa, in SOUTH 
AFRICA’S CRISIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CAN THE US CONSTITUTION HELP? 
18, 19 (Robert A. Licht & Bertus de Villiers eds., 1994) (explaining that at a 
minimum, constitutionalism entails that government is “constrained by the 
constitution and shall govern only according to its terms and subject to its 
limitations, only with agreed powers and for agreed purposes”). 
193 Rosen, supra note 191, at 276. 
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A failed constitution-drafting process and/or constitution could 
create skepticism about constitutions generally, grossly 
undermining later attempts at peace-building and at creating a 
stable, rights-based government. 
More extreme, lack of faith in constitutionally-created 
government institutions could increase tensions and bitterness 
between conflicting groups, making consensus and unification of 
the population extremely difficult.  These failures could cycle 
society back into a conflict.  In Iraq, “[c]onstitution, and 
constitution-making, instead of becoming tools of crisis 
management, and symbols of future political stability and identity, 
have become instead sources of special grievance for the excluded, 
a significant part of the fuel for the fires of a civil war.”194  All of 
these outcomes are unacceptable. 
The tensions that are likely to erupt when constitution-drafting 
and peacemaking merge, along with the potentially harsh 
consequences of a failed constitution, negate the assumption of 
compatibility of peacemaking and constitution-drafting processes.  
Whether the merger of the two processes can be salvaged is the 
subject of Section 3. 
3. SALVAGING THE MERGER OF PEACEMAKING AND  
CONSTITUTION-DRAFTING PROCESSES 
Section 2 showed that using constitution-drafting as a 
peacemaking tool without first stabilizing and securing the state, 
sets up the constitution-drafting process and constitution for 
failure and could renew or increase violence.  Yet the nature of 
many conflicts (and the parties to them) often demand some type 
of constitutional change to secure peace, making it impossible to 
simply abandon this peacemaking tool.  The best hope for 
salvaging constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool in these 
circumstances is to embark on a multi-stage or interim 
constitutional process that drafts an interim constitution before 
completing a final constitution.  The interim constitution adopts 
the initial constitutional change necessary to establish security and 
 
194 Arato, supra note 2, at 555.  See also, Samuels, supra note 1, at 671 (noting 
that a poorly designed constitution can “ferment conflict in sharply divided 
societies,” “undermine the sustainability of the peace,” and “exacerbate fault 
lines, divisions, and tensions in society”). 
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the increased security enhances the chances that the final drafting 
process and constitution will achieve both peacemaking and 
constitution-drafting goals.  In this sense, Teitel’s vision of a 
transitional constitution that mediates the process of constitutional 
change offers the best opportunity for tackling immediate 
peacemaking needs without compromising constitutional goals.195  
As Section 3.1 below describes, a multi-stage constitutional process 
could resolve many of the inherent tensions created when 
peacemaking and constitution-drafting are merged.  Section 3.2, 
however, points out that such resolution is not inevitable.  Rather, 
such resolution will depend heavily on the context of the internal 
conflict and the will of the warring groups. 
3.1. The Potential 
A multi-stage constitutional process offers the best opportunity 
to salvage constitution-drafting as a peacemaking tool when 
warring parties demand constitutional change to achieve peace—
essentially when there is no choice but to undertake constitution-
drafting.  The first step in an interim process is to establish the 
procedure for drafting an interim constitution.  This step does not 
require a cease-fire agreement though obviously one is preferable.  
Warring parties then will negotiate an interim constitution as a 
temporary document to serve as an immediate peace treaty and to 
govern the state during a transitional period away from conflict.  
The adoption of an interim constitution is the second step in a 
multi-stage interim constitutional process.  A cease-fire becomes 
mandatory only at this point. 
Interim constitutions establish a government and institutions to 
bring back stability and order to the country, which ideally are 
governed by human rights provisions contained in the text.  
Interim constitutions also detail the process for drafting a final 
constitution.  They may set at least some boundaries on the 
substance of the permanent constitution through constitutional 
principles that must be followed to maintain peace.196  Numerous 
 
195 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing Rutti Teitel’s vision of transitional 
constitutions). 
196 See e.g., Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa’s 
Final Constitution, 23 UALR L. REV. 809, 815 (2001) (discussing the initial principles 
incorporated into South Africa’s interim constitution during its bifurcated 
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agreements may be required to achieve an interim constitution and 
amendments to it may be necessary to maintain momentum 
towards peace.  
The primary advantage of a multistage process is that an 
interim constitution can secure the immediate constitutional 
changes necessary for a cease-fire without rushing into a final 
drafting process and sacrificing long-term constitutional goals.197  
An interim process allows negotiators room to address immediate 
crises without entrenching provisions for governance that would 
be inappropriate for a stable and representative state.  Whether the 
drafting process of an interim constitution at its onset favors 
peacemaking at the expense of constitutional goals or the process is 
less than fully representative will be irrelevant in large part.198  No 
final decisions are being made on elemental matters such as the 
design of the state, the relationship between the people and the 
government, and national identity.  At the end of the process, the 
only real concern is whether the permanent constitution is seen as 
legitimate. 
The temporary nature of an interim constitution also could 
make it easier for warring parties to compromise during its 
drafting.199  Interim debates are likely to be less polarizing when 
parties know they will have another opportunity to argue their 
points.  Negotiators will not need to fight as hard for favorable 
provisions and language if they know that they can change these 
 
constitution-drafting process); The Honorable Albie Sachs, J., Constitutional Court 
of S. Afr., Address on the Creation of South Africa’s Constitution, in 41 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 669, 675 (1997) (discussing the debates surrounding the drafting of 
South Africa’s constitution and noting that “[t]he Assembly was free to develop 
any provisions as long as they complied with the constitutional principles”). 
197 See Bell, supra note 15, at 398–99 (noting that peace agreements which act 
as precursors to finalized constitutions utilize broader language and set general 
principles to better allow time for eventual “deeper constitutionalization of the 
commitments [initial agreements] embody”).  
198 See Proceedings, Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, 
at 25 (arguing that it is acceptable for initial constitution-drafting to help engender 
peacemaking and political discussion in lieu of violence at early stages even if 
more specific constitutional issues concerning the broader community are not 
addressed until a later time). 
199 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1252 (observing that a constitution’s 
permanent character may render parties less willing to negotiate or cooperate). 
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provisions later if concerns remain.200  By easing compromise, 
interim processes may allow a cease-fire to be reached more 
quickly. 
Nepal provides one example of how an interim constitutional 
process can more easily secure peace than jumping straight to a 
final process.  Nepal embarked on the multi-stage process 
following a ten-year insurgency led by the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) (the Maoists)201 that demanded the end of Nepal’s 
monarchy and greater economic and social equality.202  The 
Maoists refused to enter the democratic reform process that had 
been crawling along since the early 1990s until the monarchy was 
constitutionally abolished.203  In April 2006, under enormous 
popular pressure, Nepal’s king relinquished his governing power 
to the Seven-Party Alliance (the SPA) and the existing 
parliament.204  In anticipation of future agreements with the 
Maoists, one of the first acts of the SPA was to end monarchical 
rule.  In January 2007, the SPA and the Maoists reached an initial 
agreement to draft an interim constitution to establish a process for 
the election of a constituent assembly that would be responsible 
both for drafting a new constitution and acting as a transitional 
parliament.205 
 
200 See Bell, supra note 15, at 399 (“By setting forth principles and processes 
rather than final provisions, peace negotiations can be concluded more quickly”). 
201 The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) must be distinguished from the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninists), who were not part of the 
insurgency and participated in regular politics. 
202  See, e.g., Donna Lyons, Maximising Justice: Using Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms To Address Questions Of Development In Nepal, 13 TRINITY C. L. REV. 111, 
112 (2010) (describing Nepal as a country severely divided along ethnic, caste, 
class, religious, and regional lines that have led to deep inequalities and helped 
spark the Maoist insurgency). 
203 See Bishnu Sharma et al., NepalA Revolution Through The Ballot Box, 62 
AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 513, 516–17 (2008) (noting that shortly after the reinstated 
parliament removed power from the king and drafted an interim constitution, 
“[t]he Government and the Maoists signed [a peace accord], ending 10 years of 
conflict”). 
204 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 1 (2007) (noting the 
suspension of the monarchy and the Maoist demand for a constituent assembly). 
205 See id. at 1 (“The interim constitution promulgated on 15 January 2007 
established a framework for constitutional change and enshrined the guiding 
principles agreed in earlier negotiations.”). 
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The Maoists initially demanded that the interim constitution 
guarantee a federal state under the permanent constitution.  The 
dominant parties of the SPA rejected explicit references to 
federalism.  Both groups were able to compromise quickly by 
adopting Interim Constitution Article 138, which describes state 
transformation from a “centralized and unitary” government to a 
“progressive, democratic” state.206  In November 2006, two months 
prior to the official adoption of the Interim Constitution, the 
Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord formally ending 
the insurgency that killed an estimated 16,000 people.207  The 
Maoists were satisfied with less than an explicit reference to 
federalism in the temporary constitution, which they considered to 
be implied in Article 138, allowing them to move forward in the 
peace process.208 
Overall, the Interim Constitution has been amended at least 
five times to respond to demands, which, if left unmet, could have 
cycled Nepal back into war.  This fact underscores how the 
temporary nature of an interim constitution can permit immediate 
crisis management responses without risking the stabilizing and 
foundational goals of a final constitution.  Nepal’s Interim 
Constitution and its subsequent amendments have generally 
permitted a lengthier final constitution-drafting process.  Nepal 
however, provides a limited example of interim constitutional 
processes’ potential.  As Section 3.2 describes, while the Interim 
Constitution so far can be considered a success, the final drafting 
 
206 See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, NEPAL: IDENTITY POLITICS AND 
FEDERALISM, ASIA REP. NO. 199, at 8 n.57 (2011) (“[B]y eliminating the centralised 
and unitary form of the state, the state shall be made inclusive and restructured 
into a progressive, democratic system.”(citation omitted)). 
207 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 204, at 1 (narrating the progression of the 
civil war and the ensuing peace process).  
208  See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, NEPAL, supra note 206, at 8 n.57 
(surmising from interviews with senior Maoist leaders that even though 
federalism was not mentioned expressly, the leaders believed Article 138’s 
language “implied federalism clearly enough”).  Ultimately, popular protests in 
the south plains of the Tarai just after the Interim Constitution came into force 
compelled the Constituent Assembly to amend the Interim Constitution to 
guarantee a federalist structure for Nepal in the future constitution; however, the 
failure to do so initially did not prohibit a peace agreement.  See id. at 8 (describing 
the Tarai protests which resultantly compelled the Prime Minister to “guarantee[] 
federalism”). 
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process has repeatedly stalled.  This has threatened peace and 
illustrates the limitations of multi-stage constitutional processes. 
The third stage of the interim process is the drafting of a 
permanent constitution.  For an interim process to resolve the 
inherent tensions of merging peacemaking and constitution-
drafting, the final drafting process must begin only after a cease-
fire is achieved and an interim constitution is in place.209  Having 
stopped the violence through the interim constitution, which 
fulfills the goals of peacemaking, the final process can focus on 
achieving the constitution-making goals listed in Section 1 above.  
To be legitimate or “constitutional” the process must follow the 
directives contained in the interim constitution. 
If the conflict continues unabated or if the conflict reignites 
after a respite despite the adoption of an interim constitution, then 
it is clear that there is something wrong with the interim formula 
for governance and peace.  Parties then have the opportunity to 
continue negotiations without damaging the permanent 
constitution and the growth of constitutionalism.  There is less at 
stake in such situations as the constitution does not fail, only the 
interim constitution/peace treaty. 
If the cease-fire holds, then some measure of security can be 
achieved prior to the drafting of a permanent constitution.  As 
Section 2.1 shows, security is a precondition of using a 
constitution-drafting process as tool for achieving both 
constitutional and peacemaking goals.  Security provides society 
the space to consider its long-term needs and interests, not just the 
immediate need to stop violence.  A secure society will be less 
likely to sacrifice its human rights for security.  It also will have 
less need to draw on identity and tradition to feel safe, which 
lessens the points of societal friction and broadens constitutional 
opportunities for women, minority groups, and non-conformists. 
If all sides to an internal conflict adhere to the terms of the 
interim constitution—which also functions as the peace 
agreement—they have built the foundation for additional 
compromises.  As levels of trust increase, so do the chances that 
society and the drafters will reach a meaningful consensus on a 
 
209 See Proceedings, Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, 
at 27 (stressing the desirability of reaching a cease-fire and interim agreement 
before drafting a final constitution).  
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national identity, national values, and a governance framework for 
the state either ahead of or during the final drafting process.210  
Since the Interim Constitution will have dealt with many of the 
most immediate tensions, what remains to be decided in the final 
drafting process is how to accomplish a sustainable, peaceful 
coexistence.  As trust increases, groups may be able to look past 
their immediate interests and design a state based on the needs of 
the citizenry as a whole.  An interim process that permits the 
growth of trust and security is less likely to entrench group 
divisions that perpetuate ethnic conflict. 
In this multi-stage process, peace negotiations/constitution-
drafting continue even as the interim constitution is being 
implemented and is building a foundation for stable governance.  
Interim constitutions buy weak institutions the time to develop 
and stabilize without too much pressure being placed on them.  If 
the population is discontented with the interim institutions, the 
drafters have the time and opportunity to make meaningful 
changes to them in the final constitution.  They also have the 
opportunity to reconsider interim power relationships and 
structures. 
For interim processes to achieve their goals to the fullest, the 
final constitution-drafting timeline must account for the need to 
build trust, stability, and security before reaching a consensus on 
the future of the state.  Reaching a cease-fire before beginning a 
final drafting process should allow for a longer time frame for 
drafting.  A more relaxed timeline is likely to give drafters the 
opportunity to craft a constitution to suit society’s current and 
future needs as well as one based on a unified national identity 
and national values.  The final drafting is less likely to be sloppy or 
result in unintended consequences since drafters and society will 
have time to reflect on the meaning of each provision.  With more 
time and increased trust, the need for potentially conflict-causing 
ambiguity or extreme rigidity should lessen. 
The multi-stage interim process also could ease the problem of 
inclusiveness in the drafting process.  Ideally, the fighter-
negotiated interim constitution will set up a democratic final 
 
210 See HART, supra note 1, at 11 (providing South Africa’s creation of a post-
Apartheid constitution as an example of one where trust among elites and the 
general public preceded the actual drafting process).  
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drafting process that represents all members of society and allows 
for substantial public participation.211  By doing so, the interim 
constitution could address the concerns that warring groups will 
be the primary beneficiaries of a constitution-drafting process and 
that current power relations will be entrenched in the governance 
framework.212  It also could mean that drafters will be chosen based 
on their skill and will to reach a long-term consensus rather than 
because of their affiliation with a warring party.  Assuming that 
the interim process dealt with the immediate needs and concerns 
of the parties in the conflict, drafters can respond to a broader 
range of societal groups.  Nonviolent groups and women are more 
likely to be heard since there will be less pressure for them to 
thrust aside their concerns for the sake of peace.  Practically, 
drafters will no longer risk their lives simply to accomplish their 
jobs. 
Additionally, the combination of a cease-fire and a longer time 
frame for drafting provides the public with greater opportunity to 
participate in the final drafting process.  The interim drafters can 
design a final process with a lengthy public participation 
component when a cease-fire has already been achieved and when 
it is more secure for the drafting bodies to reach the public and the 
public to reach the drafters.  On balance, public participation and a 
representative drafting process ease conflict-causing tensions, and 
increase the chances society will accept the final constitution as 
legitimate.213 
South Africa set the precedent for a successful interim 
constitutional process.  Leaders of the Apartheid regime headed by 
the National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) were 
able to accomplish the transition from authoritarian, minority 
party rule to liberal democracy without descending into a much 
 
211 See WILLIAM, supra note 147, at 32 (underscoring the importance of 
enfranchisement of societal groups in the constitution-drafting process). 
212 See Proceedings, Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, 
at 31 (“It is important to take deliberate steps to broaden participation in the 
subsequent constitution building exercise in order to counter the effects of letting 
warring factions dominate the process at the first stage.”). 
213 See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 2, at 29 (concluding that, while subject to a 
few tradeoffs, representative constitution-drafting generally counterbalances the 
“aggravated dissent and political tensions” that otherwise would result from 
constitution-drafting dominated by a single concentrated interest).    
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anticipated civil war.214  Exactly this accomplishment, however, 
makes South Africa an imperfect example of multi-stage 
constitutional processes in conflict settings.  While the Apartheid 
government and the ANC considered themselves at war,215 ending 
violence was one among many reasons the negotiations started. 
Multiple factors encouraged South Africa’s constitutional 
negotiations including, most prominently, economic and 
diplomatic sanctions, widespread political violence that weakened 
the Apartheid government, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which had been funding the ANC and whose ideology threatened 
white South Africans and their economic base.216  By the late 1980s, 
the Apartheid leadership recognized that at some point, the 
majority population was no longer going to accept minority rule.217  
It chose to negotiate the end of the regime at a time when it still 
retained some power to control the outcome of constitutional 
negotiations and before the country exploded into civil war.218  The 
ANC entered negotiations recognizing it did not hold sufficient 
 
214 The Inkatha Freedom Party, a Zulu-based party headed by Mangosuthu 
G. Buthelezi, also played an important role both as an ally to the National Party 
and as a potential spoiler of the constitutional process.  Relations between the 
ANC and the Inkatha were violent as each sought to end the power of the other.  
See Stephen Ellis, The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force, 24 J. S. AFR. 
STUD. 261, 284–86 (1998) (describing the continuation of low-intensity warfare 
during the Apartheid regime’s last years in power).  Eventually, the National 
Party and the ANC managed to sideline the Inkatha.  Id. at 290 (“On 26 September 
1992, the National Party and the ANC signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
which impliedly confined Inkatha to the margins.”). 
215 Approximately 14,000 people were killed in South Africa between 1990 
and 1994.  Id. at 263.  See also, Vincent Maphai, Prospects for a Democratic South 
Africa, 69 INT’L AFF. 223, 225–26 (1993) (noting the extensive violence that 
threatened to derail peace talks in 1993). 
216 See Hermann Giliomee, Democratization in South Africa, 110 POL. SCI. Q., 83, 
86–92 (1995) (detailing the factors that helped catalyze South Africa’s 
constitutional negotiations). 
217 Id. at 87 (noting that as the white minority South African population 
decreased and the black majority population became increasingly educated, the 
majority population’s “political discontent” and “status demands” became 
increasingly prominent). 
218 Id. at 85 (“By the end of the 1980s, the anti-apartheid struggle had 
produced such a political transformation that the regime was forced to embark on 
negotiations to replace minority rule with a [new form of government].”). 
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power to defeat the Apartheid government in a military battle.219  
Because South Africa simply feared a full-fledged civil war and did 
not face one,220 its transition falls somewhere between a transition 
from authoritarian rule and a peacemaking process.  The fact that 
there was no out-and-out civil war in any part of the country gave 
South Africa an advantage in maintaining a reasonable level of 
physical security over other examples in this article.  Despite this 
advantage and the murkiness in the type of transition underway, 
negotiations at pivotal points were driven by the need to lower the 
risk of civil war,221 which makes South Africa’s experience an 
appropriate example for constitution-drafting during conflict. 
The ANC, the National Party and numerous other groups 
formed the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
to determine how to peacefully end Apartheid rule.  South Africa’s 
interim constitutional process developed as a crisis management 
solution.222  The National Party sought a one-stage constitutional 
process where it felt it could gain significant advantages for the 
white population, refusing a democratic process.223  The ANC 
rejected an elite driven drafting process, demanding a democratic 
Constitutional Assembly as part of its fight for self-
 
219 See J. Daniel O’Flaherty, Holding Together South Africa, 72 FOREIGN AFF., 
126, 126–27 (1993) (remarking that ANC leaders had “abandoned armed struggle” 
and noting that neither party would have the strength to govern alone); Ellis, 
supra note 214, at 265 (describing how gaining political support was more 
important than violence for the ANC). 
220 See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, Creating a New South Africa, 94 FOREIGN POL’Y, 120, 
130 (1994) (mentioning how the alternative to negotiation was not desired); see 
O’Flaherty, supra note 219, at 126 (noting that the prospect of civil war pushed 
politicians to negotiate); Ellis, supra note 214, at 294 (discussing political efforts 
made by politicians to avoid civil war). 
221 See Giliomee, supra note 216, at 96 (noting the costs of non-negotiations as 
including a worsened state of the economy and increased violence). 
222 Id. 
223 See Sachs, supra note 196, at 700 (stating that the striking down of election 
proclamations was “hailed with great joy by the National party”); Murray, supra 
note 196, at 813 (describing the National Party’s goal of settling constitutional 
drafting prior to losing political control). 
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determination.224  The negotiations deadlocked over how the 
constitution would be drafted.225 
Shortly thereafter, South Africa entered a crisis period.  The 
ANC withdrew from CODESA following the killing of 38 people in 
Boipatong, believed to have been carried out by government 
forces.226  The ANC then organized mass anti-Apartheid protests, 
including in the Ciskei (tribal) homeland of South Africa whose 
black government continually suppressed the ANC.  The ANC 
assumed the loyalty of people within the homeland and were 
surprised when Ciskein security forces killed 28 ANC protestors.227  
As the points of friction increased, both sides recognized they 
could not defeat the other.228  Seemingly brought to the brink of 
civil war, the ANC and the National Party reached an agreement 
that permitted the ANC to return to CODESA where the parties 
established a multi-stage constitutional process. 
The pivotal compromise reached by CODESA was that in 
exchange for a two-year long democratic final drafting process, the 
interim constitution would contain constitutional principles that 
must be followed in the final document.229  The final constitution 
would not become law until the Constitutional Court, established 
by the Interim Constitution, certified that it fulfilled those 
principles.230  Fearing that the black majority would use its power 
to retaliate against the white minority, the National Party 
 
224 See Murray, supra note 196, at 814 (detailing that all members of the 
Parliament elected were to act as the Constitutional Assembly in 1994 for the 
purpose of drafting the final constitution). 
225 See HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 133–47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (describing the deadlock as not 
one of principle, but one of political power, which fueled intense mistrust, bust 
eventually came to an end). 
226 See Ellis, supra note 214, at 289 (describing the attack as a potential 
consequence of suspended negotiations). 
227 See id. at 289–90 (describing the attack and the reaction of South African 
locals who believed that it was the work of the security forces). 
228 See Giliomee, supra note 216, 91–92 (commenting on the stalemate between 
the white government and the opposition). 
229 See Murray, supra note 196, at 814–15 (outlining some of the main 
principles that were included in the interim constitution); Sachs, supra note 196, at 
675 (discussing public involvement in the debate over constitutional principles). 
230 See Sachs, supra note 196, at 676 (describing the role of the Constitutional 
Court and Assembly in meeting the two-year deadline). 
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demanded democratic guarantees of freedom of association and 
minority language and religious rights in these principles.231  The 
ANC sought to limit the principles to avoid unfair concessions to 
the white minority, such as a white veto or overrepresentation of 
the National Party.232  Albie Sachs, a South African Constitutional 
Court judge and participant in the constitutional negotiation, 
explains:  “We ended up with thirty-four principles . . . .  There is a 
lot of detail in the principles because this was our modality for 
making everybody feel comfortable with the proceedings and 
ensuring that no one felt the constitution was a result of the 
triumph of one section of society over another.”233  This 
compromise allowed the National Party to guarantee protection for 
its minority constituency without wholly undermining the ANC’s 
demand for a democratic drafting process.234  At this point, 
violence continued throughout South Africa, but it had not reached 
the level of a civil war, which allowed for a longer time frame for 
accomplishing constitutional goals. 
South Africa completed its constitution-drafting exercise in 
May 1996.  The Constitutional Assembly took full advantage of the 
two years it had for drafting to educate the population about the 
constitutional debates and to embark on public consultations.  
Polls showed that the public consultation process and education 
campaign had reached nearly three-fourths of South Africa’s 
population and that the Constitutional Assembly had received 
more than two million submissions from the public.235  The 
Constitutional Court initially did not certify the constitution, 
finding provisions in conflict with the constitutional principles.  
After revisions, the Constitution of South Africa came into force in 
February 1997. 
 
231 Id. at 672 (describing the importance of harmonizing incompatible 
interests of the minority and majority parties). 
232 See Giliomee, supra note 216, at 100 (explaining the complex power 
dynamics of race in South African politics); Sachs, supra note 196, at 670–71 
(discussing the minority’s desire for constitutional protections and fear of 
retribution from the majority). 
233 Sachs, supra note 196, at 673. 
234 See Sachs, supra note 196, at 670–72 (describing the compromise between 
the National Party and African National Congress). 
235 See Murray, supra note 196, at 817 (detailing public reactions to the 
Constitutional Assembly’s public participation program). 
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South Africa’s success at staving off an all out civil war and 
creating a stable foundation for the state lies in large part in a 
multi-stage process carefully negotiated so that everybody felt that 
their interests were protected even as they were forced to 
compromise.236  All the parties to CODESA had a stake in the 
interim process and the interim institutions, which kept the 
country from bursting into civil war.  The long process of 
negotiations that started in 1990 further permitted some trust to 
build between the parties, which allowed each to make concessions 
important to the other.  Both sides managed to find common 
ground in their support for a democratic political system that 
offered some guarantees to minority groups, which established the 
basis for a national identity.237  Furthermore, the longer time frame 
for drafting permitted an inclusive process, both through the 
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly and public 
consultation, which gave the final constitution strong democratic 
legitimacy and provided a stable foundation for the future.238 
3.2. No Guarantee 
Despite the rosy picture painted here of an interim 
constitutional or multi-stage drafting process, such an undertaking 
does not guarantee success in both constitutional and peacemaking 
goals.  Rather, it offers the greatest opportunity to harmonize those 
goals.  The tensions that arise when drafting a permanent 
constitution as a cease-fire/peace-agreement are inherent to a one-
step process.  In an interim process, those tensions are no longer 
inherent but could still erupt easily. 
Whether a conflict-filled country will benefit from the multi-
stage process depends heavily on the will of the warring parties to 
compromise with each other and whether they design a final 
process that avoids these tensions.  The more fragile the cease-fire 
and the more uneven the balance of power between conflicting 
 
236 See Herbst, supra note 220, at 121 (describing the historic but reluctant 
compromise between the parties and the particular concessions of both the 
National Party and the African National Congress). 
237 See Sachs, supra note 196, at 672 (discussing the importance of each party 
identifying with the principles of the new constitution). 
238 See Murray, supra note 196, at 817 (highlighting the wide array of input 
and opinions that were taken into account when drafting the constitution).   
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parties, the easier it is for negotiators/drafters to design a process 
that undercuts the benefits of a multi-stage constitution-
drafting/peacemaking process.  For example, where the potential 
for renewed violence is great, peace-makers are more likely to 
push for a quick final drafting process.  The hope is that the final 
constitution will succeed where the interim one failed.  The rushed 
final process then causes the inherent tensions described in Part 2.2 
to resurface as security, stability and trust do not have time to 
develop sufficiently to allow for great compromises or the building 
of national values and identity. 
Iraq’s experience with an interim constitution illustrates how a 
multi-stage process will not always save a constitution-drafting/ 
peacemaking process, particularly when the expected cease-fire 
following the adoption of the interim constitution never 
materializes.  The United States government and the Iraqi Interim 
Governing Council drafted the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL) in March 2004 to serve as Iraq’s interim constitution.239  The 
TAL established an eight-month drafting period to follow the 
election of an interim National Assembly and permitted one six-
month extension of the process.240  The National Assembly delayed 
appointments to the constitution-drafting committee for more than 
five months, leaving drafters less than three months to complete a 
draft constitution.  They then chose not to seek an extension for 
drafting despite mounting evidence that one was necessary both 
for establishing peace and meeting long-term constitutional 
goals.241 
 
239 See generally Eileen Babbitt, The New Constitutionalism: An Approach to 
Human Rights from a Conflict Transformation Perspective, BERGHOF CONFLICT 
RESEARCH 67 (2010), available at http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue9_babbitt_comm.pdf (analyzing 
the importance of building inter-community relationships throughout the political 
process to secure human rights through the creation of the constitution); see also 
International Crisis Group, Iraq: Don’t Rush The Constitution, MIDDLE E. REP., June 
2005, at 10 (listing state structure, religion and national identity as being among 
the main issue TAL identified in the Iraqi constitution building process).  
240 See Nathan J. Brown, Post-Election Iraq: Facing the Constitutional Challenge, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, DEM. AND RULE OF L. PROJECT POL’Y 
OUTLOOK, Feb. 2005, at 2 (chronicling the difficulties the National Assembly faced 
in drafting a permanent constitution). 
241 See Morrow, supra note 58, at 8–10 (discussing whether an extension 
would have helped the Committee produce a better result). 
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While experiences elsewhere showed the need for a long 
drafting process in post-conflict situations,242 the continued conflict 
with Sunni insurgents drove the United States to seek a short 
drafting period as part of their plan for the “transfer of 
sovereignty” to the Iraqis.243  Foreign governments who opposed 
the U.S. invasion, ordinary Iraqis who wanted to see the end of the 
U.S. occupation, and Iraqi leaders who thought a quick drafting 
process would consolidate their current power, also supported a 
short drafting period.244  Self-interest and condemnation of the 
U.S.-led war, rather than concern for the needs and long-term 
interests of the Iraqi people, drove the choice for a drafting 
timeframe.  The same concerns, as well as fatigue on the part of 
Iraqis, led the United States and the Iraqi leadership to reject any 
extension.245  These mostly inappropriate considerations for a 
rushed constitution-drafting process directly undercut the benefits 
of an interim constitution and reinstituted the inherent tensions 
that arise from the merger of peacemaking and constitution-
drafting processes.  As described in Parts 2.2.1-2.2.2, the resulting 
harm to the goals of both processes was enormous.  As the 
insurgency continued to rage, the population grew more polarized 
and the constitution failed to garner legitimacy.  
Another possible stumbling block to a successful multi-stage 
process is if a group foresees a benefit in stalling the process.246  If 
any negotiating group believes delaying the process will lead to 
power gains, an interim process is far less likely to succeed at 
peacemaking or constitutional goals.  Even when inadvertent, a 
 
242 See Brown, supra note 240, at 1–2 (commenting on the low success rate of 
constitutions written in post-conflict nations); see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 
189 (recounting the intense political conflict in Colombia even after the 
government drafted a new constitution in 1991). 
243 See International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge, MIDDLE E. 
REP., Nov. 2003, at 6–7 (explaining the United States’ reasons for rushing the 
constitutional drafting process).  But see id. (noting Paul Bremer’s statement that a 
rushed drafting process would be dangerous). 
244 See id. at 6 (describing how constitutional questions became intertwined 
with the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq). 
245 See Brown, supra note 240, at 4–5 (describing the series of ambitious 
deadlines for writing and adopting the Iraqi constitution). 
246 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1289 (“[A]greements may be particularly 
difficult to arrive at in circumstance in which one or more powerful groups 
believes it will be in a better position to strike a deal at some future time . . . .”).   
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delayed interim constitutional process that continually fails to 
achieve a meaningful consensus could undermine faith in peace 
efforts and constitution-drafting.  It also could leave a power 
vacuum where there is no clear support for a particular 
government or until elections can ensure representation.247 
Nepal’s final drafting process for a permanent constitution, 
initially discussed in Part 3.1 above, underscores these points.  The 
Interim Constitution established a Constituent Assembly (CA) 
elected on the basis of proportional representation to serve as the 
interim parliament and to draft the constitution.  The Maoists won 
approximately forty percent of the seats in a 2008 election, forming 
a coalition government with the Communist Party of Nepal United 
Marxist-Leninist party (UML) and the Nepali Congress Party.  The 
coalition government and constitution-drafting fell apart over the 
design of a federalist state and how to deal with the nearly 20,000-
strong Maoist army.248  Drafters missed their constitution-drafting 
deadlines of May 2010, May 2011, and August 2011 over these 
issues as groups remain deadlocked.249  The Maoists in particular 
 
247 See Workshop on Constitution Building Processes, supra note 5, at 26–27 
(noting the propensity for a power vacuum without a national or international 
body to provide governmental services).  Nepal provides an important example of 
this power vacuum.  See Asian Development Bank, Nepal: Political And Economic 
Update, http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/validation/NEP/in324-10.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 Nepal continues to experience a difficult political transition following 
the end of the decade-long civil conflict in April 2006.  The transition has 
been further complicated by the lack of a clear majority of any political 
party in the 601-member Constituent Assembly (CA) elected in April 
2008 and delay in the constitution drafting process which was scheduled 
to be concluded by 28 May 2010. 
Id.; see also Ishaan Tharoor, After Maoist Protests, Nepal Faces a Murky Future, TIME, 
May 12, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1988455,00.html 
(outlining potential problems in the aftermath of a Nepal’s delay in constitution 
drafting). 
248 See Sagar Rijal, Issue Brief, Destabilization in Nepal, ODU MODEL UNITED 
NATIONS SOCIETY 2 (2011) (describing the issues associated with the integration of 
Maoist forces). 
249 See Kiran Chapagain, Nepal Averts Crisis Over Constitution Deadline, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A9 (describing how Nepal’s political parties averted 
political collapse by extending the deadline for the country’s new constitution). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
05 LUDSIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:22 PM 
302 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
 
have been accused of subverting the drafting process for personal 
gain.250 
The continued intransigence of the parties in the final drafting 
process and the absolute distrust between them has left a power-
vacuum in Nepal.  Despite their plurality of CA seats, the Maoists 
were unable to sustain a coalition government and were unwilling 
to join a coalition in which a different party held the Prime 
Minister’s role.251  Numerous parties also have sought to exclude 
the Maoists from power.  As each constitution-drafting deadline 
passed, two-thirds of the CA needed to vote to amend the Interim 
Constitution to change the deadline and extend the CA’s authority.  
Without Maoist agreement to an extension, the CA, the peace 
process and constitution-drafting risked collapse.  In May 2010 and 
again in May 2011, the Maoists agreed to the amendment but only 
if the existing coalition government resigned.252  This forced new 
Constituent Assembly elections for government posts, including 
the Prime Minister, leading to four Prime Ministers in four years.  
In 2010, it took seven months before the CA was able to elect a 
Prime Minister.  After sixteen attempts to choose one, in February 
2011 the Maoists gave their support to Jahalanth Khanal, a United 
Marxist-Leninist candidate, based on an agreement over the Maoist 
troops that satisfied both parties.253  The CA and new Prime 
Minister failed to concretize the agreement, and as the May 2011 
deadline approached, parties again agreed to extend the term for 
the CA, this time only for a three-month period, and again forced 
 
250 See Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nepal Selects a Premier, Ending a 
Stalemate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at A10 (describing allegations of Maoist 
subversion of the constitution drafting process). 
251 See generally International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process, 
ASIA REP., Feb. 2009 (outlining several roadblocks to a sustained peace in Nepal).  
252 See Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nepal Avoids Political Crisis With Broad 
Deal to Extend Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A8 (describing the 
agreement struck between the political parties which prevented the dissolution of 
parliament); see also Chapagain & Yardley, supra note 250 (describing Maoist 
conditions for amending the constitution). 
253 See Nepal: Multiple Challenges Remain After Long-Awaited Election of Prime 
Minister, EUR. INTERAGENCY SEC. F. (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://www.eisf.eu/alerts/item.asp?n=12175 (describing the process leading up 
to the election of Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal and the instability that still 
remains after his election). 
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the Prime Minister to resign.254  This process was repeated in 
August 2011, after which a Maoist was elected Prime Minister and 
the constitution-drafting process was extended to November 30, 
2011. 
The risks to Nepal are high without clear leadership and 
consensus.255  This type of stalemate could easily cycle Nepal back 
into violence.256  The predominant fear at this point is that the 
general population, extremists on either side or historically 
unrepresented ethnic groups will grow sufficiently frustrated with 
the current constitutional process and resort to violence to end the 
deadlock.257  Commentators view the recent election of a Maoist 
Prime Minister as a hopeful sign that the constitution-
drafting/peace-process will move forward, or at least ease 
immediate tensions, but only time will tell.258  As the Nepali 
example shows, having an interim constitutional process is no 
guarantee that peace and a stable foundation for a state will be 
achieved. 
Even where peace is seemingly less fragile, fighters could 
deprive a multi-stage process of a successful merger of 
peacemaking and constitution-drafting goals if they refuse to cede 
the final drafting process to the broader population or if they 
inappropriately protect their interests.  The warring parties could 
agree to constitutional principles that entrench power imbalances 
 
254 See Chapagain & Yardley, supra note 250 (illustrating the political 
wrangling involved in Nepal’s constitution-drafting). 
255 Adding to the risks of violence caused by a power vacuum, the United 
Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), which was responsible for monitoring the 
cease-fire agreements, mediating the disarmament of Maoist troops and their 
integration into the regular Nepal army, and monitoring the Nepalese army for 
abuses, withdrew in late 2010 to force the end of the status quo and shake-up the 
negotiations between parties.  See Press Release, Security Council, ‘We are Not in 
Favour of Repeated Extensions of UN Mission in Nepal in Climate That 
Undermines Its Ability to Function Effectively,’ Security Council Hears, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10053 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
256 See EUR. INTERAGENCY SEC. F., supra note 253 (suggesting that lack of 
leadership could result in a resurgence of faction violence). 
257 See Rijal, supra note 248 (analyzing the effects of political deadlock on the 
Nepalese security situation). 
258 See Gopal Sharma, Nepal Parliament Elects Maoist Prime Minister, REUTERS, 
Aug. 28, 2011, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/28/idINIndia-
59015120110828 (noting that the Prime Minister’s election “raises hopes for revival 
of the edgy peace process and could settle the future of Maoist combatants”). 
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as parties attempt to hold onto their negotiating power.259  Interim 
negotiators may insist on a power-sharing relationship that does 
not represent the interests of the broader population resulting in “a 
mere division of spoils between powerful players.”260  Crisis 
management may demand these compromises, permitting short-
term peace goals to override long-term constitution-drafting goals. 
Afghanistan provides an important example of how crisis 
management permitted warring parties and powerful interests to 
hijack the final drafting process to the detriment of peace and the 
constitution.  Afghanistan has a long history of civil war between 
warlord-headed regional factions that independently controlled 
much of Afghanistan.  Many of the warlords and their foot soldiers 
were known for committing severe human rights violations and 
terrorizing the populations within their control.261  The Taliban 
were able to reign in some of the regional conflicts through 
violence and co-option.262  During the US-led invasion to route out 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan following the 9/11 
attacks, the US depended heavily on many of these warlord-
headed regional factions to provide fighters against the Taliban. 
In December 2001 when it looked as though the US and its 
backers were succeeding at their mission against the Taliban, the 
U.S.-aligned regional warlords, along with an elite group of 
Afghans, signed the Bonn Agreement to design a blueprint for 
achieving a stable Afghanistan.263  The Bonn Agreement did not 
end the conflict with the Taliban but rather presumed its defeat.  
One commentator describes that, “the Bonn Agreement was not a 
peace agreement between belligerents, but a statement of general 
 
259 See Samuels, supra note 1, at 24 (describing some of the intricacies in 
resolving factional fighting with a negotiated peace agreement and constitution). 
260 Id. at 27. 
261 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “KILLING YOU IS A VERY EASY THING FOR 
US”: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN (July 2003) (detailing the 
human rights violations taking place in Afghanistan). 
262 See International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process, 
ASIA REP., June 2003, at 22 (noting the difficulties the United States and NATO 
faced in dealing with multiple regional military groups after the fall of the 
Taliban). 
263 See Esther Pan, Afghanistan: Karzai vs. the Warlords, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-karzai-vs-
warlords/p7791 (detailing the beginnings of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan). 
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goals and intended power sharing among the victors of a 
conflict.”264  Although it is not an Interim Constitution, the Bonn 
Agreement functioned as one.  It established the interim 
framework for governance by adopting a modified version of 
Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution; it sought to reform or strengthen 
existing and interim institutions in anticipation of a permanent 
constitution; and it outlined the process for drafting a permanent 
constitution, which are the primary functions of one.265  For this 
reason, this Article treats Afghanistan’s recent constitutional 
process as multi-stage. 
Because the Afghan constitution was drafted during an 
ongoing conflict, the warlords heading the regional factions, who 
much of the population viewed as criminals, had undue influence.  
The United States continued to back the warlords in order to 
maintain their alliance against the Taliban.  Further, many feared 
that without the Taliban a power vacuum would return 
Afghanistan to the pre-Taliban civil war state where these regional 
factions would start fighting each other for power.266  Policy 
makers hoped to co-opt the warlords into supporting a centralized 
government by bringing them into the transitional governance 
process.267  Crisis management demanded that the regional factions 
and their warlord leaders participate in the Bonn Agreement as 
well as in the constitution-drafting process.268 
 
264 Schneider, supra note 1, at 180. 
265 See supra Part 2.1. 
266 See Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. OF 
DEMOCRACY 5, 7–8 (2004) (discussing the issues that arose under Afghanistan’s 
five previous constitutions between 1923 and 1987). 
267 See Pan, supra note 263 (detailing efforts made to include warring factions 
in the constitutional process). 
268 Technically, warlords were not permitted to participate in the 
constitutional loya jirga, yet they managed to have numerous representatives 
elected to it and, in a few instances, the warlords themselves were elected.  John 
Sifton, Afghanistan’s Warlords Still Call the Shots, THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
Dec. 24, 2003, republished by Human Rights Watch at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/12/23/afghanistans-warlords-still-call-
shots. 
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With their power on the rise,269 the warlords were unwilling to 
cede the constitution-drafting process to the broader population.  
Short-term gains to end Taliban control and to achieve a modicum 
of peace in Afghanistan were allowed to prevail over long-term 
constitutional goals and the need for sustainable peace.  Thus, 
during each of the two drafting periods, warlord factions had a 
significant voice.  The first drafts emerged from a nine-member 
Constitution Drafting Committee appointed by Transitional 
President Hamid Karzai; the group produced two separate drafts 
reflecting a split in the members.270  Karzai later appointed a thirty-
five-member committee to merge the two drafts and respond to 
public consultations.271  The larger committee was made up mostly 
of members of the regional factions272 causing some to accuse 
Karzai of choosing members based on “factional bargaining . . . 
without . . . consideration of the public interest.”273  These same 
 
269 See Barbara Haig, Democratization Efforts in Afghanistan, NAT’L ENDOWMENT 
FOR DEMOCRACY (Nov. 19, 2003) http://www.ned.org/about/staff/barbara-
haig/democratization-efforts-in-afghanistan. 
The power of the warlords, who still command their own heavily armed 
militias, was greatly strengthened by their role in the 2001 war against al-
Qaeda.  Ever since Bonn, they have succeeded in sidelining both the 
people and the central government, in large part by putting themselves 
ostensibly at the forefront of the antiterrorism campaign and the 
reconstruction process. 
Id. 
270 See J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557, 566–67 (2007) (describing the process of dual-drafting the 
constitution of Afghanistan). 
271 See id. at 567 (noting that the second, larger, Constitutional Drafting 
Commission represented a broader political and ethnic spectrum than the first 
Commission, and received greater international support); Schneider, supra note 1, 
at 192 (discussing the Constitutional Commission’s efforts to solicit public 
opinion); see also International Crisis Group, supra note 262, at 15 (discussing the 
creation of the second Constitutional Drafting Commission). 
272 See Klaus-Peter Klaiber, The European Union in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned, 
12 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 7, 9 (2007) (discussing the Bonn agreement’s key 
objective to have all major ethnic communities in Afganistan participate in 
establishing a democratic government); James Ingalls, The New Afghan 
Constitution: A Step Backwards for Democracy, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Mar. 10, 
2004), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_new_afghan_constitution_a_step 
_backwards_for_democracy (describing how the Afgan Consitution only 
solidified some of the problems that existed prior to Afghan “democracy”). 
273  International Crisis Group, supra note 262, at 16. 
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regional factions monopolized the constitutional loya jirga where 
their representatives formed a majority of the delegates that 
finalized and adopted the constitution in January 2004.274 
Although the mandate of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
(CDC) clearly stated there would be public consultations about the 
draft constitution,275 the CDC and United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), which assisted in the drafting 
process, restricted any meaningful public access to the draft 
constitution.  In fact, they directly refused to release a draft in April 
2003, ahead of the public consultation process, claiming that it 
would risk polarization of the population on particularly 
contentious issues276 and that it would create public confusion.277  
According to J. Alexander Thier, who served as a legal advisor to 
Afghanistan’s Constitutional and Judicial Reforms Commissions, 
the Constitutional Drafting Commission and UNAMA wanted to 
limit public debate in large part to allow for an “elite compromise 
between existing power-holders” and “backroom deal-making.”278  
The over-representation of warlords resulted in a constitution 
process perceived by many Afghans to be illegitimate, causing 
 
274 See Thier, supra note 270, at 570 (reviewing the organizational structure of 
the Constitutional Loya Jirga); see also Afghanistan: Constitutional Process Marred by 
Abuses, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jan. 8, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/news 
/2004/01/07/afghanistan-constitutional-process-marred-abuses (detailing 
concerns about warlords and factional leaders strong-arming and bribing loya jirga 
delegates). 
275 See Schneider, supra note 1, at 190 (describing the Constitution Drafting 
Committee’s assurance that the public would be consulted during the 
constitution-making process). 
276 See Thier, supra note 270, at 568 (laying out the timeline of the 
constitutional drafting process and President Karzai’s reluctance to make the first 
draft available to the public); International Crisis Group, supra note 262, at 15 (“To 
justify the refusal to publish, Commission and UNAMA officials claimed that a 
published draft would have a negative impact on public debate because it would 
polarise opinion.”). 
277 See International Crisis Group, supra note 262, at 26 (“The fear of public 
confusion . . . is a disingenuous concern that trades on an inaccurate and 
demeaning stereotype of rural Afghans who lack formal education.”). 
278 Thier, supra note 270, at 569.  Thier concluded that although there was 
ultimately some public consultation, “the reluctantly gathered opinions of the 
public were swept under the carpet in last-minute backroom deal-making.”  Id.  
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observers to lament that “a manipulated constitutional loya jirga 
has undermined the constitution’s legitimacy.”279 
The warlords were not the only ones with undue influence.280  
Transitional President Hamid Karzai received immense U.S. 
support as a potential reformer.  The United States pushed for a 
centralized, presidential system to consolidate Karzai’s power 
despite heavy objections from many Afghans who thought a 
parliamentary system would offer greater representation to the 
population and from the warlords who wanted to keep more local 
power.  Karzai and the United States won as the constitution 
adopted a centralized Presidential system.281 
Crisis management not only weakened the legitimacy of 
Afghanistan’s permanent constitution, it also failed at 
peacemaking.  Again the Bonn Agreement assumed a Taliban 
defeat that was never realized.  In fact, the Taliban seem to be 
gaining support at least in part from Afghans fed up with the 
warlords and U.S. influence in the country.282  By assuming an 
eventual defeat, the Bonn process glossed over any need for 
Taliban participation in the constitution-drafting process.283  Now, 
the Afghan leadership is considering negotiations with it.  Because 
 
279 Samina Ahmed, Warlords, Drugs, Democracy, THE WORLD TODAY, May 
2004, at 15.  
280 See Brendan Whitty & Hamish Nixon, The Impact of Counter-Terrorism 
Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 5 TAIWAN J. OF 
DEMOCRACY 187, 196 (2009), available at http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0501/187-
218-Brendan%20Whitty.pdf (describing the large influence of local and regional 
commanders and international donors as a limitation on the Afghan government). 
281 See Thier, supra note 270, at 572 (describing the branches and balancing of 
power in the newly organized Afghan government); Editorial, An Afghan 
Constitution, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at A14 (“[I]t now seems probable that the 
assembly will approve . . . a draft that will create a strong presidential system of 
government . . . .”).  
282 See Lakhdar Brahimi, Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future, 4 GEO. J. INT’L 
AFF. 75, 76 (2003) (noting that Taliban members were not present at Bonn, but still 
expressing hope that less radical Taliban members may, in the future, join the 
peacemaking process); Ahmed, supra note 279, at 15 (describing the difficulties 
faced by the Afghan government and the further complications resulting from the 
presence of international influences, local warlords, and Taliban who seek to 
establish a resurgence in the area). 
283 See Rubin, supra note 266, at 6 (enumerating the groups that took part in 
the Bonn process and attributing the Taliban’s absence to its status as an enemy to 
the new state). 
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the Taliban sees itself as negotiating from a position of power, it 
will likely reopen constitutional negotiations to create a power-
sharing regime and to adopt a greater role for Shari’a law,284 
underscoring the short-sightedness and poor timing and procedure 
of Afghanistan’s multi-stage constitutional process. 
An interim process also does not guarantee that societal groups 
will be able to locate a shared identity or that they will not more 
strongly identify and coalesce as separate groups.  As Jackson 
explains, “moving from transitional to final may be particularly 
problematic in deeply riven societies . . . .  Interim agreements, to 
gain consent, may have the effect of reinforcing group cohesion.”285  
The interim agreements in Lebanon did little more than delay the 
conflict.  As Part 2.2.1.2 describes, Lebanon repeatedly undertook 
constitutional changes to power-sharing arrangements considered 
temporary (and therefore part of a multi-stage constitutional 
process), at all times waiting until the population could unite 
behind a national rather than group identity.  In the nearly century 
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its control over 
Lebanon, these temporary arrangements have done little more than 
continually polarize the different groups and delay violent conflict. 
Despite these risks, when conflicting parties demand 
constitutional change, interim constitutional measures provide a 
better opportunity for creating sustainable peace and achieving 
constitutional goals than a one-stage constitution-
drafting/peacemaking process.  Interim drafting and constitutions 
should be viewed as a mechanism for addressing immediate cease-
fire needs and for providing concrete changes while putting the 
least amount of pressure on a constitutional process.  If utilized 
appropriately, an interim constitutional process allows warring 
groups and society the time and space to establish some level of 
security, trust and stability before embarking on a drafting process 
 
284 See Matt Waldman, Navigating Negotiations in Afghanistan, U.S. INST. OF 
PEACE: PEACE BRIEF, Sept. 13, 2010, at 4, available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2052%20Navigating%20Negotiations
%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (arguing that, based on field research, negotiations 
could lead to a power-sharing agreement, but forewarning that it would likely be 
difficult to implement); see also International Crisis Group, supra note 262, at 6 
(commenting on the required balancing of interests between Islamic law and 
Western law when drafting the Constitution). 
285 Jackson, supra note 1, at 1290.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
05 LUDSIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:22 PM 
310 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
 
for a final constitution.  For this reason, interim constitutional 
processes hold the potential to alleviate most of the tensions 
created by a merged constitution-drafting/peacemaking process. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Constitution-drafting has come under immense pressure as 
policy-makers have sought to use it as a peacemaking tool.  They 
have simply assumed the compatibility of constitution-drafting 
and peacemaking processes.  Put under deeper scrutiny, however, 
the assumption proves to be false.  Deep and inherent tensions 
surface during the merger of these two processes.  Peace requires 
immediate compromise between warring parties to stop the 
violence, while constitution-drafting requires time, security, unity 
and popular participation to create a strong and lasting foundation 
for a peaceful and stable state.  Peace requires often short-term, 
pragmatic solutions to the underlying causes of conflict, while 
constitution-drafting requires an agreed to, and at least partially 
idealistic, vision for the future.  Because of the priority we place on 
protecting life, constitutional goals will always be subordinated by 
peacemaking needs when those goals and needs conflict. 
This undue pressure on the constitution-drafting process and 
the subordination of constitution-making goals jeopardizes the 
success of both peacemaking and constitution-drafting.  Such 
pressure risks creating a poor governance framework; weakening 
human rights protections; entrenching societal divisions; de-
legitimizing the new constitution; and renewing violence.  
Ultimately, using constitution-drafting to make peace sets up the 
merged process for failure. 
Practically, when warring parties demand constitutional 
change to achieve peace, it is impossible to abandon this 
peacemaking tool.  A multi-stage interim constitutional process 
could be a compromise between these demands and the risk of 
failure of a constitution-drafting process undertaken during a 
conflict.  An interim constitutional process can respond to the 
immediate pressure for constitutional change necessary for 
achieving a cease-fire while providing the opportunity to build 
trust, security and a national consensus necessary to achieve 
constitution-drafting goals in a permanent constitution.  A multi-
stage process can succeed only if security is achieved prior to the 
drafting of a final constitution.  While the context of any conflict 
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can undermine the benefits of an interim process, it offers a better 
opportunity for accomplishing peacemaking and constitution-
drafting goals than a single-stage process conducted during on-
going violence.  
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